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Structural Regulation as Antidote to
Complexity Capture
Robert F. Weber*
The [structural] approach rejects the idea that some institutions should be
allowed to become “too important to fail”. Instead of asking who should
perform what regulation, it asks why we regulate banks. It draws a clear distinc-
tion between different activities that banks undertake. The banking system
provides two crucial services to the rest of the economy: providing companies
and households a ready means by which they can make payments for goods
and services and intermediating flows of savings to finance investment. Those
are the utility aspects of banking where we all have a common interest in
ensuring continuity of service.1
An accepted principle of system design is to avoid complexity and tight
integration of different components or interfaces. Complexity is the enemy of
both reliability and security, engineers are fond of saying. The more complex the
system, the greater the chance of the unexpected interaction of components, even when
they are not faulty in themselves. A truly complex system may be impossible to fully
comprehend, and the unexpected interactions may not appear for a very long
time . . . .2
INTRODUCTION
This article proposes a new way of thinking about the ways in which
financial market complexity threatens the future viability of financial
regulation. Much of the contemporary discussion of “complexity” in finan-
cial markets suffers from a lack of definitional clarity. This article examines
financial complexity in the context of the ample literature on complexity
*Wellspring Professor of Entrepreneurship, Economic Development, and Business Law,
University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank the University of Tulsa College of Law for the
generous summer research grant that supported this research.
1Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech to the Scottish Business Organizations
6 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/
speech406.pdf (emphasis added).
2CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE 260 (3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added).
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from the physical and social sciences that has, to date, been underappre-
ciated in law and economics scholarship. According to this physical and
social science literature, “complexity” means something more than “very
complicated” or “difficult to understand.”
Increasingly complex forms of social organization, such as the con-
temporary global financial system, threaten the theoretical justifications
and the everyday practices of the administrative state. For the better part
of the last fifty years, the administrative state has struggled to justify its
existence in the face of two traditional lines of attack: (1) a political uproar
over the perceived excesses of regulatory red tape3 and (2) the academic
“public choice” critique—from both the Left and the Right—that
regulators are “captured” by industry, which purchases favorable public
policy from regulators in exchange for private benefits such as later
employment.
Yet in the financial regulatory arena, administrative law’s problems
run deeper still. Regulators, like all agents charged with tasks, are limited
by their bounded rationality;4 in other words, they possess limited capaci-
ties to process information, maintain their attention, and calculate.5 While
to some extent bounded rationality is endemic in the regulatory context
because regulators are not operating the business concerns “on the
ground,” there are reasons to believe the problem is qualitatively different
for contemporary financial regulators. These regulators face a structural,
3The former is evident in the 112th Congress’s efforts to pass the REINS Act, which would
require significant regulations and rules to be presented before and approved by Congress
before going into effect, in the process erecting a presumption of invalidity against regulatory
action. See Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10, 112th
Cong. (2011); Editorial, Undermining the Executive Branch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A26 (“In
a nutshell, the bill would stop any major regulation issued by a federal agency and costing
more than $100 million from taking effect unless it received approval from both houses of
Congress and the president.”). On December 7, 2011, the House of Representatives passed
the REINS Act, but the current Senate is not expected to pass the bill. Felicia Sonmez, REINS
Bill to Expand Congressional Power over Executive Regulations Passed by House, 2CHAMBERS (Dec. 7,
2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/reins-bill-to-expand-
congressional-power-over-executive-regulations-passed-by-house/2011/12/07/
gIQAs6VMdO_blog.html.
4See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (describing the concept of bounded rationality).
5These limitations operate independently of funding shortfalls, and would exist, albeit to a
lesser degree, even under an adequately funded regulatory regime.
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widening epistemic gap between what they are able to know and what they
need to know in order to administer the statutory mandates of their
agencies. This epistemic gap results from dramatic increases over the past
two decades in the complexity of the markets and institutions regulators
are charged with overseeing. New research by complexity scientists has
begun to reveal many ways in which financial institutions transact in
markets that are authentically complex, rather than merely complicated or
difficult to understand.6 These complex markets are susceptible to unpre-
dictable and nonlinear phase transitions, positive feedback effects, “normal
accidents,” complexity catastrophes, and conflicting constraints.7 The
regulatory toolkit has changed little in response to these new uncertainties
and unpredictable threats; in the meantime, however, regulators’ respon-
sibilities have become more difficult by orders of magnitude.
This plays out in problematic ways in the financial regulation
context. If financial markets are indeed complex rather than merely com-
plicated, then the statutory mandates of regulatory agencies—the most
important of which involve the promotion of systemic financial stability
and the safety and soundness of individual institutions—need to be
reevaluated. In conditions of complexity, bounded rationality emerges
as less of an obstacle to be overcome and more of a structural impedi-
ment to the achievement of regulatory objectives. To the extent
regulators rely on industry itself to provide the information they require
to make a good-faith effort at performing their mandates, they risk
complexity capture—a soft, hegemonic capture of even virtuous, public-
regarding regulators who are resistant to traditional capture efforts by
6Even within the academic community, dozens of definitions of complexity are present. See
John Horgan, From Complexity to Perplexity, SCI. AM., June 1995, at 104, 106 (noting that a
physicist affiliated with the Santa Fe Institute counted “at least 31” definitions of complexity
as of 1995); infra Parts II.C, II.D.2 (summarizing or citing to complexity-related research
conducted by physicists, philosophers, economists, biologists, anthropologists, and sociolo-
gists). Because complex systems are defined by their unpredictability and resistance to
simplifying assumptions, it might be objected that “complexity science” is a contradiction in
terms, and that “complexity studies” might be more accurate. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E.
PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE
4 (2007) (describing the “science of complexity” as “an obvious misnomer”). In any event, the
lack of consensus as to a fixed definition of the term evidences the fecundity of the research
programs under the complexity umbrella.
7See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
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industry.8 The alternative might be worse still: to ratchet up the granu-
larity of prescriptive rules in an attempt to counteract or temper every
emergent property of the financial system that might increase risk or
uncertainty, in the process rendering the regulatory system more opaque,
arbitrary, and complex in its own right.
But the choice between arbitrary regulation and complexity capture
is avoidable. This article promotes a model of structural regulation—as
opposed to behavior-based or conduct-based regulation—as an antidote to
the complexity conundrum. By ramping back the complexity of those
elements of the financial system that regulation is designed to protect, such
as savings aggregation and payment system facilitation, lawmakers can
give regulators concrete and achievable mandates. But reformers have
largely eschewed structural reform and instead fixated on implementing
their mandates through a reactive and highly particularized system of
behavioral regulation designed to counteract industry’s incentives to
assume socially unacceptable levels of risk. Since, as I will show, regulators
lack the basic information necessary to administer such a system, they have
delegated core regulatory functions to industry. The result is increased
complexity capture and regulatory dysfunction.
Part I sets the theoretical framework out of which the notion of
complexity capture arises. It synthesizes the traditional public choice
account of regulatory capture with the law and economics literature on
agency costs. According to the public choice theorists, regulators are
bought off by industry in exchange for private benefits such as future
employment. The public, of course, suffers from these private arrange-
ments, but is beset by collective action problems that prevent it from
becoming informed and organizing opposition. These straightforward
observations link up nicely with the theory of agency costs. Of particular
importance here is the basic tenet that agency costs increase as it becomes
more difficult for citizen–principals to monitor their regulator–agents.
Part II presents the article’s main argument regarding how increased
complexity in financial markets has created complexity capture and regu-
latory dysfunction. It begins in Part II.A by introducing how boundedly
8Not only would this hypothetical subset of regulators be immune to temptations to exploit
their offices for pecuniary gain, it would also pursue earnestly its delegated responsibilities
without embracing conciliation as a result of distaste for confrontation. See IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 80, 90 (1992) (discussing how capture might be explained
in part by a desire for a “smoothly running work life” and distaste for confrontation).
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rational regulators struggle to promote their statutory mandates during
changing circumstances—even those that are not characterized by com-
plexity. As noted earlier, traditional regulatory capture theory focuses
on the difficulties of citizen–principals monitoring their regulator–agents.
But when regulators struggle with bounded rationality in complex
environments, they often come to rely on industry for information in
the pursuit of their statutory mandates. This creates a significant, and to
date underappreciated, problem: under these circumstances, industry
becomes an agent of the regulators and a new set of agency costs emerges in
the form of complexity capture.9 When charged with regulating markets
characterized by complexity, regulators face the unenviable choice of
either subjecting themselves to complexity capture or avoiding excessive
reliance on industry-provided information and implementing a system
of increasingly particularized, but arbitrary and perhaps illegitimate,
regulatory commands. Part II.B ties this theoretical discussion to the
specific context of contemporary financial regulation by briefly outlining
the statutory mandates with which Congress has charged U.S. financial
regulators.
Part II.C summarizes what it means for systems to be “complex.”
Complexity theory, in the physical and social sciences, comprises several
wide-ranging research programs, but certain of its attributes are especially
relevant to financial regulation. In particular, Part II.C focuses on how (1)
the prevalence of positive feedback effects in complex systems prevents
them from settling into stable equilibrium states; (2) network effects can
cause complex systems to slip into catastrophe in ways that defy ex ante
prediction; and (3) following the work of Charles Perrow, the coexistence
of interactive complexity and “tight coupling” of system components
results in “normal accidents”—that is, breakdowns in order characterized
equally by inevitability and unpredictability.
Part II.D explains why, in many respects, contemporary financial
markets can be thought of as complex systems by providing a qualitative
assessment of the financial system’s network topology and summarizing
some recent computer-based experimental research demonstrating the
complexity of financial markets. If the contemporary financial system is
indeed characterized by complexity, then the system’s structure might
9These agency costs should be thought of as a measurement of the extent to which actual
regulatory policy and enforcement diverges from what it would be under conditions of better
information.
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result in the emergence—that is, the development of attributes that are
impossible to discern ex ante by observing the behavior of individual actors
within the system—of negative externalities such as systemic risk. Most of
the legal and economic scholarship devoted to systemic risk inquires into
traditional microeconomic issues such as the moral hazard resulting from
government safety nets. Though this incentive- and behavior-related
scholarship is critically important, recent events and research suggest that
the network structure of the financial system merits more attention as a
regulatory problem than it currently receives. Once financial system
behavior is considered through the lens of complexity theory, the opera-
tional challenge to financial regulation emerges in full relief. This analysis
suggests a conclusion that many commentators miss, but which is critical to
the argument this article presents—the inherent unpredictability of the
behavior of complex financial markets might exacerbate the bounded
rationality problem to such a degree that it constitutes a structural impedi-
ment to the achievement of regulatory objectives. The viability of public
regulatory control may be at stake.
Having elaborated on the threat posed by complexity capture, I next
turn in Part III to potential solutions. This part describes differences
between structural regulation and behavioral regulation, and explains
how policy makers have largely opted for the latter, even though by doing
so they preserve the conditions where complexity capture is likely to
persevere. While the behavioral–structural binary is certainly not the only
way to analyze financial regulatory tools and systems, its emphasis on
structure holds special promise in addressing the problem of complexity
capture, which arises in large part out of the network structure of contem-
porary financial markets. I propose that structural reform, by directly
adjusting the topologies of the networks through which the business of
finance is conducted, can pare back complexity and protect the core
functions of finance from complexity capture. In the wake of the financial
crisis of 2008–2009, two sets of reform packages illustrate the consistent
preference for behavioral regulation over structural regulation, despite
the presence of several serious structural reform proposals. First, the
capital adequacy regime embodied in the Basel III Framework makes
minor, reactive adjustments to the risk-weighting rules applicable to bank
assets, but leaves in place the general infrastructure that outsources the
assessment of risk to regulated banks and rating agencies on the grounds
that their assessments are perceived to be more accurate than any pre-
scriptive regulatory methodologies. Second, lawmakers and regulators
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have begun to require large, systemically important financial institutions to
prepare and discuss with regulators so-called “living wills.” Living wills are
designed to counteract the tendency to bail out insolvent institutions
during times of market distress by setting forth in advance the steps by
which an institution will be resolved—that is, wound up—in an orderly
manner if it becomes insolvent. Lawmakers perceived correctly that
orderly and efficient resolution of insolvent institutions will limit conta-
gion, but lacked confidence in regulators’ ability to impose effective plans
on large, interconnected institutions. However, the reliance on the regu-
lated firms themselves to prepare the living wills undercuts the likelihood
of the initiative’s success.
In the cases of capital requirements and living wills, policy makers
and regulators have continued to respond to complexity through behav-
ioral regulatory tools that delegate primary responsibilities to industry. Far
from confronting the challenges posed to financial regulators by increased
complexity, these reforms are precisely the sort of regulatory techniques
that are susceptible to complexity capture and regulatory dysfunction.
Instead, I argue for increased focus on promoting structural regulatory
reforms to build a more resilient financial system.
I. A SYNTHESIS OF TRADITIONAL THEORIES:
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND AGENCY COSTS
The purpose of financial regulation is to correct market failures that result
in the inefficient or socially suboptimal allocation of resources. These
market failures reflect shortcomings of purely private market orderings
comprised of transactions among self-interested parties. A privately
ordered market outcome can be said to have “failed” if it does not achieve
a given socially desirable outcome or objective, which can be purely
economic, such as Kaldor-Hicks efficient capital allocation,10 or pre-
dominantly non-economic, such as ensuring that the sick can obtain
health insurance by prohibiting coverage denials based on preexisting
10See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12–15 (7th ed. 2007) (describing Kaldor-
Hicks economic efficiency as the criterion that a transaction makes at least one person better
off by an amount greater than the amount that would be required to compensate third parties
who are worse off as a result of the transaction).
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conditions.11 To remedy the failure, the administrative state intervenes to
promote outcomes that the market is unable to achieve on its own. The
optimal amount of regulation promotes the regulatory objective up to the
point where the marginal social benefits of regulation equal the marginal
private costs of the regulation.12 In that way, private parties are made to
bear the external costs of their actions. When regulators are captured by
industry, they are less able to promote this optimal balance, and the
regulatory logic is reversed; industry acquires private benefits at the
expense of other societal groups that have not captured the regulator, such
as smaller competitors, credit card customers, retail merchants, depositors,
insurance policyholders, and even—if bailouts are likely—taxpayers at
large.
Because regulatory capture theory looks at regulators’ incentives as
primary units of inquiry, it can be illustrated through the use of agency
theory.13 According to the traditional two-part agency model of public
administration, regulators are agents of the polity charged with correcting
market failures. For example, the regulatory agents of the New Deal
administrative state were technical experts that conceived of and imple-
mented the “best” solutions to problems.14 They became expert in modern
forms of social life—such as financial markets—in which the polity, whose
citizens are busy with their own specializations, could not possibly become
11See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
34 (1991) (“Cost-benefit analysis cannot be the only standard for evaluating government
decisions. For technical reasons, cost-benefit analysis—or more specifically, the underlying
standard of economic efficiency—cannot be applied until a prior decision is made about how
to distribute social entitlements.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its
Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 338 (2011) (noting that regula-
tory attempts to correct market failures with economically efficient regulation often end up
raising “deep philosophical questions” requiring consideration of distributive effects of regu-
lation in addition to the efficiency-related effects).
12See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 136–38 (2005).
13Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 207 (2006).
14E.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 123–67 (1930); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 285 (1997); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 558 (2000) (describing faith of “public interest theory”
exponents in expert agencies to master technical problems); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342,
371 (2004) (“During the New Deal era, a key feature of the organization of law and order was
the commitment to centralized, institutional decision-making authorities relying on profes-
sional, official expertise.”).
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expert.15 New Deal architect James Landis compared regulators to corpo-
rate managers, who are charged with the task of using their industrial
expertise to “build[] a system which . . . may more nearly approximate a
given desideratum.”16 The New Deal administrative state can therefore be
said to respond to a corporate logic, in addition to its political-legal
attributes that receive more attention in the legal literature.
Corporate law scholars are well familiar with the costs and benefits of
delegating to an agent the performance of tasks that require the exercise of
the agent’s discretion. Adolph Berle, Jr. and Gardiner Means described the
new industrial logic of Fordist mass production, which required firms to
seek (1) large-scale investment capital more readily obtained from public
equity markets than from retained earnings and founding entrepreneurs17
and (2) a new class of managers that, unlike most founding entrepreneurs,
had expertise in increasingly differentiated and specialized fields. Thus,
ownership separated from control, leading to the emergence of a class of
manager–agents acting on behalf of passive, capital-providing shareholder–
principals.18 These manager–agents could exploit their positions of control
and consume perquisites at the expense of the shareholder–principals.
This capital-intensive, specialized mass production system was more
efficient in many respects than the previous era, but it created a tax on firm
15Cf. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) (“With the rise of regulation, the
need for expertness became dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowl-
edge of the details of its operation . . . .”).
16Id. at 13.
17The National Bank Act, the McFadden Act, and the Glass-Steagall Act compelled industrial
firms to seek capital in public markets because those laws prevented the formation of large
financial intermediaries capable of providing the required sums of capital to finance large-
scale industrial projects. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 3–7, 21–25, 54–59, 94–100 (1994).
18See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 3–10, 17, 66–67, 112–15 (2d ed. 1968); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics
of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 672 (1995) (book review) (“Important
technological changes during the decades preceding publication of [The Modern Corporation
and Private Property], especially the development of modern mass production techniques, gave
great advantages to firms large enough to achieve economies of scale, which in turn gave rise
to giant industrial corporations. These firms required enormous amounts of capital, far
exceeding the resources of any single individual or family. Only the aggregation of many
smaller investments, accomplished by selling shares to investors, could finance these indus-
trial giants.” (footnotes omitted)).
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profitability in the form of agency costs, which are the incremental costs of
having an agent perform a task on behalf of a principal. In 1976, Michael
Jensen and William Meckling formalized in economic terms the problem
that Berle and Means had identified decades earlier: total agency costs are
the sum of (1) the monitoring costs expended by the principal to limit
misappropriations by the agent, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent
to demonstrate loyalty, and (3) the residual loss in the form of self-serving
behavior on the part of the agent.19 Simplifying somewhat, it will be
advantageous to the principal to incur monitoring and bonding costs for so
long as those costs diminish the residual loss by a greater amount. In the
regulatory context, the residual loss refers to the divergence from optimal
regulatory policy resulting from regulators’ pursuit of their private pref-
erence sets at the expense of their regulatory responsibilities.
As a precondition to any effective monitoring of regulator–agents,
affected regulatory constituencies need to adequately inform themselves
regarding regulated events. The monitoring costs result from the need to
acquire, process, and distribute relevant information. Armed with that
information, affected groups are better able to police the exercise of
regulatory discretion. But a constituency’s ability to become informed
about events affecting it depends on the complicatedness and salience of
the regulated events and the degree of dispersion of the constituency’s
membership. An understanding of complex transactions in, and obscure
corners of, financial markets is often prohibitively expensive.
As an example, consider the plight of concerned taxpayers or small-
business credit users who fear the federal banking regulators are not
adequately supervising the solvency of a bank. In most industries, the
issues giving rise to similar worries would be policed by shareholders and
counterparties, but limited shareholder liability, federal deposit insurance,
and special super-priority protections that survive in conservatorship dull
or eliminate the incentives of these parties to monitor the bank’s solvency.
Thus, the regulator’s role is to supervise the bank and prevent it from
taking socially unacceptable levels of risk that could result in bailouts and
taxpayer losses or contagion throughout the financial system. Regulators
have countless tools to use in exercising this supervisory responsibility,
and taxpayers and small business owners have incentives to monitor the
19See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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regulators to ensure they are doing their job. However, taxpayers and
small business owners face prohibitively high information costs when it
comes to assessing complicated matters such as the optimal level at which
regulators should set banks’ Tier 1 capital requirement.20 Further, when
the affected constituency is widely dispersed and its membership continu-
ally changing—as is the case with small-business credit users, other finan-
cial services consumers, and certainly taxpayers—consumer advocacy
organizations, journalists, interest groups, and academics incur still more
costs to distribute and present the information to constituents in a
readily comprehensible way. These further costs are simply the result of
the collective action problem that forms the backbone of public-choice
scholarship.21
20Tier 1 capital consists of those sources of a bank’s capital base that are perceived to be of
high quality, including, most prominently, common equity. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND
BANKING SYSTEMS 5 (2010) [hereinafter BASEL III FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs189.pdf. Even bank regulation experts have wide disagreements as to the correct
answer to the question of the optimal level of Tier 1 capital requirements. In theory, the
answer depends on the optimal trade-off between the marginal decrease in systemic risks and
bailout costs on the one hand and the marginal increase in banks’ cost of capital (and resulting
price increases for services) on the other hand. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 26–27 (2008). It is at once a highly political
and highly technical conundrum on which regulators and experts themselves disagree. See
Anat Admati et al., Healthy Banking System Is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2010, at 8 (“If . . . at least 15% . . . of banks’ total, non-risk-weighted, assets were funded by
equity, the social benefits would be substantial.”); Editorial, Time Finally to Make Banks Safe,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at 10 (noting that David Miles of the Bank of England has com-
mented that socially optimal capital ratios might be as much as double the ratios embodied in
the Basel III Framework’s capital rules to be implemented by 2019); Anat Admati et al.,
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not
Expensive 57–59 (Stanford Working Paper, 2011) [hereinafter Admati et al., Fallacies], available
at http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/CFs11/Admati.pdf (suggesting that capital
levels of twenty to thirty percent on an unweighted basis should not be “unthinkable” and
describing capital levels of ten percent “should be seriously considered and thought of as
feasible”); Morris Goldstein, Integrating Reform of Financial Regulation with Reform of the Inter-
national Monetary System 6–7 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ. Working Paper No. 11–5, 2011),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp11-5.pdf (claiming that market-induced
minimum capital at the bottom of the credit cycle was eight percent of total assets, which,
combined with the seven percent of total assets that was wiped out during the crisis, suggested
that a required capital ratio of fifteen percent of total assets is appropriate).
21See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship,
50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 657–59 (1997) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997)).
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Collective action problems and the complicatedness of the regulatory
arena can cause the costs of monitoring regulators to increase well beyond
the marginal social utility that the monitoring would promote.22 Where
monitoring proves ineffective, the only way to limit the residual loss is to
increase bonding expenditures. The traditional response of administrative
law has been to impose bonding costs—in the form of antibribery statutes,23
mandatory recusal for regulators,24 asset divestiture requirements,25
postservice employment industry restrictions,26 judicial review,27 rotating
personnel requirements,28 and other similar restrictions on agency discre-
tion29—to counteract regulators’ tendency to exploit their positions by
pursuing private preferences at the expense of their delegated responsibili-
ties. These devices aim to redirect regulators’ incentives away from private
22If affected regulatory constituencies—in the above example including taxpayers and small
business owners—were rational actors, they might incur the bonding costs to avoid the
massive knock-on effects of a rash of bank insolvencies on unemployment, gross domestic
product, and other economic metrics. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 223–39 (2009). But monitoring will
occur only if the ex ante perceptions of loss avoidance are sufficiently high, which is unlikely,
if not impossible, where a credit bubble is developing.
23See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (criminalizing, among other things, the receipt by U.S.
“public officials” of bribes and illegal gratuities).
24See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy, Fed Tightens Rules on Regional Directors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2009,
at A6 (reporting on the Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB’s) amended conflict of interest rules in
response to controversy over the chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (N.Y. Fed.) at the time, Stephen Friedman, receiving a waiver from then-existing rules
that would have prevented him from holding Goldman Sachs shares, which he eventually
sold, while he was a member of the N.Y. Fed. board).
25E.g., 5 C.F.R. § 6801.103(a) (2011) (prohibiting FRB employees from holding any debt or
equity interests in banks, bank affiliates, and securities firms).
26See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1812(e) (2006) (imposing a two-year postservice window within which
outgoing members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) board of directors
who did not serve their full terms may not be employed by a bank).
27See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
28See, e.g., PETER GRABOSKY & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE: ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 198 (1986).
29See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing these and other “equalizing factors” or features
of institutional design in administrative law that check capture of regulators).
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aggrandizement and towards earnest pursuit of their statutory mandates.
They are costly because they restrict the talent pool of individuals willing to
serve as regulators and might also limit flexible regulatory action that would
otherwise better promote regulatory objectives. Moreover, no matter how
thoughtfully and subtly designed, the bonding mechanisms will not coun-
teract every potential abuse and the regulator–agents will be able to exercise
some discretion to satisfy personal preferences at the expense of statutory
regulatory objectives, particularly if the complicatedness of the regulated
arena frustrates ex ante bonding mechanism design.
Thus, regulators are free to exercise their discretion where they can
act outside the watching eye of the polity—in other words, the monitoring
expenditures are inadequate—and without fear of legal censure—in other
words, the bonding mechanisms are not comprehensive. Some theorists
have referred to this freedom-to-operate as “slack.”30 The problem of slack
can be conceptualized from the opposite direction, as an opportunity for
regulators to bribe industry in exchange for keeping the polity in the dark
about undesirable industry behavior and not elevating such behavior onto
the public regulatory agenda.31
Regulatory capture theories founded in neoclassical economics
assume regulators are individual “rational actors” seeking to utilize their
position, or consume slack, to realize their personal preference sets. But
there are reasons to resist the global categorization of regulators in the
fashion of homo economicus. Regulators’ choices are only sometimes deter-
mined by those first-order, self-regarding preferences that neoclassical
economics predicts—such as later employment,32 favorable returns on
investments in regulated industries, or political support. At other times,
their preferences are ideological or psychic and might even operate to the
30See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 179 (1990).
31Cf. Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986) (exploring the role that collusion plays in three-part agency
relationships, particularly with respect to agents bribing supervisors not to report suboptimal
efforts to principals).
32See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9 (reporting that recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enforcement directors have gone on to employment at Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase,
Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse and noting that a “casual observer could be forgiven for
thinking that the whole point of landing the job as the S.E.C.’s director of enforcement is to
position oneself for the better paying one on Wall Street”).
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financial detriment of the regulator. But even adopting this more nuanced
view of regulators’ motivations to include ideological commitments, civic
virtue, and moral principles—the satisfaction of which can, as with any
preferences, itself be cast in microeconomic terms—requires consideration
of the pressures that interest groups (in this case, industry) bring to bear in
their attempts to direct administrative action away from the policies of
Landis’s disinterested experts.
While this discussion of regulatory capture and agency cost theory
provides a useful model to evaluate the downside of delegating functions
to self-regarding or ideological regulators, it assumes that the regulators
themselves are able to consume slack by exploiting the gap between their
understanding and that of their constituents. That assumption does not
always hold. Sometimes regulators—even those virtuous regulators com-
mitted to public-regarding agendas and policies—are captured before they
even know it.33 In the process, industry becomes the agent of the regula-
tors and appropriates the residual loss for itself. Even more troublingly, the
residual loss may even increase inasmuch as it affects public-regarding
regulators too.
II. HOW COMPLEXITY CAPTURE FRUSTRATES
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
This Part describes the central problem this article confronts: how increas-
ing complexity in financial markets might threaten to undermine attempts
at regulatory control of the financial sector. The traditional theory of
regulatory capture is premised on expert regulators pursuing self-
regarding goals at the public’s expense. However, as described in Part II.A,
under conditions of complexity regulators may find themselves in situa-
tions where they lack the basic access to information on which to exercise
their discretion in a rational manner, whether to pursue self-regarding
profit or their public-regarding regulatory goals. Regulators’ bounded
rationality becomes the defining characteristic of the regulatory program.
33Cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J.
1321, 1326, 1332 (2010) (noting that “information capture”—defined as a “system that puts
the decisionmaker at the mercy of an unlimited flood of information from an unopposed
group”—can be “[e]ven more insidious” than traditional capture, because “under the right
circumstances capture will take place even if the dominant participants are not trying to
manipulate the system”).
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At that point regulators might be tempted to rely on industry to provide
them with information, which results in a form of complexity capture that
in some respects is more insidious inasmuch as it affects all regulators and
not merely those susceptible to traditional capture.
Any analysis of the effectiveness of regulation or the prevalence of
capture must start with an accounting of what the regulatory objectives
are. Part II.B provides a summary of certain of the key responsibilities with
which bank regulators are charged. In the United States, chief among
these responsibilities is the promotion of systemic financial stability and the
safety and soundness of individual institutions. The achievement of these
objectives, which requires an understanding of the events giving rise to
and transmitting instability, is complicated by several degrees of magni-
tude as our understanding of the financial system transforms from a
simple, predominantly equilibrium-based model to a complexity model.
Next, Part II.C addresses a lacuna in the argument presented thus far by
linking the notion of complexity capture directly to the growing research
program of complexity science, with particular attention to the importance
of positive feedback mechanisms, network effects, and “ normal accidents.”
Part II.D summarizes some recent experimental research showing that
financial markets do in fact have attributes of complex systems and dis-
cusses the implications of this complexity for financial regulation.
A. The Problem of Regulators’ Bounded Rationality
The traditional regulatory capture story assumes that regulators under-
stand the markets they regulate. It relies on the New Deal model of the
expert regulatory agency in possession of superior knowledge to that of
the public. If regulators did not understand markets, they would be unable
to identify slack and exploit it. Once we relax this assumption to take
account of regulators’ considerably bounded rationality, it becomes neces-
sary to construct a three-part agency model by introducing industry into
the regulator–polity relationship discussed above.
No matter how complex or straightforward a regulated market is, its
regulators will always rely to some extent on industry to provide them with
information on risks that threaten to frustrate the regulators’ delegated
responsibilities. In other words, there is always an epistemic gap between
what regulators know and what they would optimally know to best
effectuate their delegated responsibilities. Max Weber recognized this
organizational dilemma: “[T]hose who continuously participate in the
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market intercourse with their own economic interests have a far greater
rational knowledge of the market and interest [in the] situation than the
legislators and enforcement officers whose interest is only ideal.”34
Economists would refer to this epistemic gap as evidence of regula-
tors’ bounded rationality. Herbert Simon coined the term “bounded ratio-
nality” to refer to the limited capacities to process information, keep
attention, and calculate that economic actors bring to bear in making their
economic decisions.35 In other words, humans are “intendedly rational,
but only limitedly so.”36 According to Charles Lindblom’s more colorful
formulation, “The human condition is small brain, big problems.”37
Whereas the “economic man” of canonical microeconomics maximizes his
utility by choosing the optimal solution among a set of options, in the real
world all we can do is “satisfice,” by which Simon means that we accept
courses of action that are just “good enough.”38 In coming to our decisions,
we utilize heuristics to facilitate our limited computational abilities in light
of the dizzying amount of available information.39 At best, we can say that
economic actors try to make good decisions based on the information and
abilities they have, which is a far cry from claims that economic actors
weigh all available information and formulate an optimal decision.
34MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 38 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max
Rheinstein trans., 1967).
35See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS xxviii–xxxi (3d ed. 1976); Herbert A. Simon, Introduction, in
ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 3, 3 (Massimo Egidi & Robin
Marris eds., 1992); see also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW.
461, 464 (1992) (describing Simon’s bounded rationality as referring to the “psychoneuro-
logical limits of the human mind to process information—hence, the limitations on human
ability to plan and to solve complex problems”). Simon had discussed the concept of bounded
rationality for decades before he coined the term. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955) (“Broadly stated, the task is to replace
the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with
the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by
organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist.”).
36OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45 (1985) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
37CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’s POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 66
(1977).
38See SIMON, supra note 35, at xxix.
39See id.
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This discussion of bounded rationality ties into the agency cost
model.40 If the virtuous, public-regarding regulators with which this article
is primarily concerned were not boundedly rational, they would be able to
implement regulatory regimes that pursued their agencies’ statutory
objectives in an optimal manner; there would be no ambiguity about the
fit between the rules and regulations on the one hand and the market
ordering that resulted from those rules and regulations on the other
hand.41 Agencies could devote their limited resources to supervision and
enforcement.
As markets become more dynamic and complex, bounded rationality
and its attendant agency costs increasingly frustrate attempts to implement
an optimal regulatory regime. Under these circumstances, regulators
themselves incur significant information costs to make use of their posi-
tions at all—whether for ideological or self-regarding consumption of
slack, or for pursuit of the regulators’ statutory mandates.42 This dilemma
is implicit in regulatory practice; Richard Stewart identified it as a struc-
tural impediment to effective regulation over three decades ago:
Regulated interests have a further advantage in all phases of decisionmaking
because the information upon which the agency must ultimately base its
decision must come to a large degree from the groups being regulated. . . . It
is therefore not surprising that there is a tendency for agencies to rely unduly
on facts and arguments advanced by regulated firms.43
40See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 89–104
(2008) (discussing that collective decision-making entities like corporate boards can limit
agency costs by constraining tendencies of individuals to, among other things, shirk their
duties as a rational response to their bounded rationality).
41These hypothetical optimal regulatory regimes would be the public law analog to private
law’s equally aspirational complete contracts—that is, contracts that specify courses of action
for every possible contingency. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT 160 (1992) (“Because real people are only boundedly rational, complete
contracts that specify what they will do in every conceivable circumstance are impossible to
negotiate and write.”).
42See Christoph Knill & Andrea Lenschow, Modes of Regulation in the Governance of the European
Union: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND
REGULATORY REFORMS FOR AN AGE OF GOVERNANCE 218, 231 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur
eds., 2004) (noting that “in cases of highly detailed regulation,” the “regulated industry itself
is the best source of . . . information,” which “gives the industry a degree of leverage over
regulatory arrangements which, in the extreme case, might lead to capture”).
43Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1713–15 (1975); cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
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Around the same time, Charles Lindblom noted that “because every
person in high authority needs information, he comes to be in some
degree a captive of knowledge specialists.”44 But more and more fre-
quently regulators find themselves in the position of the Coast Guard
inspector who noted, during congressional testimony about the BP oil
spill, that “[t]he pace of technology has definitely outrun the regulation.”45
In a complex operating environment, bounded rationality inhibits regu-
latory practice and industry can operate without meaningful monitoring
by regulators. This freedom to operate, which might be labeled “industrial
slack,”46 is potentially more detrimental to regulatory goals because it
affects regulators of all preference sets—whether purely virtuous and
public-regarding or venal and rent-seeking.
When charged with regulating an industry characterized by com-
plexity, regulators face a structural dilemma: they can either conduct
regulatory policy by, in effect, guessing at what optimal rules and enforce-
ment would be, or they can delegate their duties to industry itself.47 This
problem currently pervades financial regulation. The former approach
risks arbitrariness and lacks legitimacy, and the latter exposes the
regime to massive agency costs as regulatory practice diverges from
Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999) (“[F]irms in regulated industries . . .
occupy a favored position in regulatory and political structures that allows them the advan-
tage in influencing agency decisions [because they] . . . often have information without which
a regulatory agency cannot do its job.” (footnote omitted)).
44LINDBLOM, supra note 37, at 120.
45Richard H. Thaler, Recipes for Ruin, in the Gulf or on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2010, at
BU4 (quoting a Coast Guard inspector).
46Cf. Levine & Forrence, supra note 30, at 185 (labeling regulators’ freedom to operate outside
of the public’s watchful eye as “slack”).
47Even assuming trenchant market complexity and the absence of meaningful structural
reform to combat it, financial regulators wield a third option: public bailouts of private firms
whose complexity poses spillover risks to the rest of the financial sector and economy. I
proceed on the assumption that public bailouts are an unacceptable ad hoc regulatory tool.
But, as amply illustrated by the trillion-dollar bailouts in the United States and the United
Kingdom during 2008–2009, regulators and legislators might invest public funds to prop up
insolvent institutions to preserve the ongoing functioning of the financial system. It should be
borne in mind that the bailout problem, like the twin threats of arbitrary regulation and
complexity capture discussed above, is born out of complexity. To the extent complexity
frustrates regulatory control over the largest, most complex firms, and concomitantly creates
conditions for bailouts or complexity capture, those firms will guard their complexity as a key
source of competitive advantage.
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optimal implementation of regulatory objectives. The latter approach, in
particular, results in what might be termed complexity capture—a softer,
hegemonic regulatory capture that makes regulators behave as if they were
captured because they are following industry’s lead. This is not to say that
industry understands complex markets significantly better than regula-
tors. However, when complexity causes a financial crash, industry can fall
back on the excuse that they were taking marching orders from the
constituency to which they are accountable: their shareholders, whose
attitude is ambivalent to the complexity-risk nexus. After all, shareholders
stand to gain in the lead-up to a crash in the form of higher-than-normal
returns due to higher leverage. Regulators, by contrast, have no such
luxury, as their marching orders from Congress are ambitious and do not
admit the possibility of occasional shirking.48
Figure 1 below illustrates how complexity capture differs from tradi-
tional regulatory capture:
48See infra Part II.B.
Large, Complex Financial Institutions
(e.g., Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Bank of 
America, Goldman Sachs, Barclays, 
HSBC, UBS, AIG, Wells Fargo) 
Regulatory Bodies
(e.g., Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve, Federal Reserve Banks, SEC, 
CFTC, FSOC, OCC, FDIC, Basel 
Committee, G20 Finance Ministers) 
Non-Industry Affected Regulatory 
Constituencies
(e.g., depositors, annuitants, 
policyholders, credit card users, small 
business credit users, bailout-funding 
taxpayers) 
Complexity Capture 
(resulting from regulators’ 
reliance on industry-provided 
information  to pursue 
regulatory objectives) 
information requested by regulators to  
understand market 
Traditional Capture 
(resulting from public’s 
inability to monitor 
regulatory action) 
information necessary for public to understand 
regulation 
Figure 1. How Complexity Capture Differs from Traditional Capture.
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But before assessing how complexity frustrates the statutory objec-
tives of financial regulators, two clarifications are in order: it is necessary,
first, to individuate what those objectives are and, second, to provide
much-needed definitional clarity on what it means for a market to be
“complex” in the first place.
B. Static Goals in Shifting Sands: Statutory Objectives of Financial Regulators
The statutory supervisory mandates of bank regulators are wide-ranging
and ambitious. For example, the FRB is charged with supervision of (1)
holding companies that contain a depository institution,49 (2) state banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System,50 and, (3) since the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, nonbank financial institutions that
are judged to be systemically important by the newly formed Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).51 The holding company supervisory
responsibilities include, most prominently, examining the financial and
operational risks that might pose a threat to either (1) the safety and
soundness of any depository institution within the holding company struc-
ture52 or (2) the stability of the financial system in the United States.53 Its
supervisory responsibilities with respect to state member banks consist of
49See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a (2006) (setting forth FRB responsibilities in the regulation of thrift
holding companies); id. § 1844 (setting forth FRB responsibilities in the regulation of bank
holding companies).
50See id. § 1813(q)(3) (listing the FRB as the “appropriate Federal banking agency” for these
and certain other categories of banking institutions). The supervisory responsibilities with
respect to foreign bank branches operating in the United States are spread among the FDIC,
the FRB, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). See id. § 1813(q).
51See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 112(a)(2)(H), 124 Stat. 1376 (directing the FSOC to “require supervision by the
[FRB] for nonbank financial companies that may pose risks to the financial stability of the
United States in the event of their material financial distress or failure, or because of their
activities pursuant to section 113”); id. § 113 (authorizing the FSOC to subject nonbank
financial companies to FRB supervision and prudential standards); id. §§ 161–171 (autho-
rizing FRB to subject nonbank financial companies designated by FSOC to FRB’s reporting,
capital, and examination requirements, as well as heightened prudential standards and
certain restrictions on affiliation, management interlocks, and acquisitions).
52For a description of safety and soundness generally, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 251–308 (4th ed. 2009).
53See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West Supp. 2011).
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monitoring the safety and soundness of the individual institutions. The
OCC and the FDIC have safety and soundness supervisory responsibilities
with regard to, respectively, national banks and state banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System.54 For these regulators, safety and
soundness is viewed in the context of the institution as a whole and is
restricted only “by its limitation to practices with a reasonably direct effect on
an [institution’s] financial soundness.”55 In a report to Congress during
consideration of the 1966 legislation vesting bank regulators with the
authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to banks engaging in “unsafe or
unsound practice[s],” then-chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, John Horne, underscored the difficulty of promoting the fixed goal
of safety and soundness in the ever-changing banking business:
The concept of “unsafe or unsound practices” is one of general application
which touches upon the entire field of the operations of a financial institution.
For this reason, it would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a
single all-inclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of activities which
are embraced by the term . . . . Like many other generic terms widely used in
the law, such as “fraud,” “negligence,” “probable cause,” or “good faith,” the
term “unsafe or unsound practices” has a central meaning which can and must
be applied to constantly changing factual circumstances. Generally speaking,
an “unsafe or unsound practice” embraces any action, or lack of action, which
is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible
consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or
damage to an institution, its shareholders, or . . . the [FDIC].56
54See 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (“There is established in the Department of the Treasury a bureau to be
known as the ‘Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’ which is charged with assuring the
safety and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations, fair access to financial
services, and fair treatment of customers by, the institutions and other persons subject to its
jurisdiction.”); id. § 1831p-1(a) (directing “appropriate Federal banking agenc[ies]” to pro-
mulgate safety and soundness standards for “all insured depository institutions”); id.
§ 1813(q) (defining “appropriate Federal banking agency” as the FDIC “in the case of a
State nonmember insured bank or a foreign bank having an insured branch” and as the
OCC in the cases of national banks, federal thrifts, and “any Federal branch or agency of a
foreign bank”). In contrast to the FRB, the OCC and FDIC do not have responsibilities to
monitor risks to financial stability, even at the institutional level.
55Gulf Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir.
1981) (emphasis added).
56Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 3695
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 112 Cong. Rec. 26,474 (1966) (memorandum
submitted by John Horne, chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board). Horne’s
comments currently appear in the FDIC’s examination manual, testifying to their continued
importance in banking law and regulation. See FED. DEP. INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL
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Thus, the safety and soundness regulators are responsible for coun-
teracting events and activities that present a “reasonably direct effect” on
an institution’s financial health—an open-ended, wide-ranging charge.57
Or stated in Horne’s terms, regulators must remediate activities that are
no easier to identify than negligence, good faith, and other open-ended
designations. But, unlike the courts that adjudicate disputes regarding
those legal terms, bank regulators must perform this task in real-time and
without the benefits of hindsight and an elaborate fact-finding trial.
With the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991, Congress emphasized that bank
regulators were responsible for monitoring banking activities closely. Spe-
cifically, it instructed the bank regulators to impose standards relating to
management, operations, compensation, asset quality, earnings, and stock
valuation to use while conducting their safety and soundness examinations
of the institutions within their respective purviews.58 Congress also
directed the U.S. banking regulators in FDICIA to promulgate generally
applicable risk-based capital requirements on banks and required inter-
vention when banks became undercapitalized.59 These capital require-
ments, as will be discussed in detail below, require any entity assessing
capital needs, whether a unit within the bank or a regulator, to make
OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 15.1 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/
manual/section15–1.html.
57See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2006) (authorizing bank regulators to issue cease-and-desist orders
to banks that engage in any “unsafe or unsound practice”); Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–242, § 132, 105 Stat. 2236, 2267–70
(adding § 39(e) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), which provides express authority
for bank regulators to, among other things, require a bank to raise more capital in the event it
fails to redress violations of guidelines and rules promulgated under bank regulators’ safety-
and-soundness authority). Some commentators refer to these regulators as “microprudential”
regulators to distinguish them from the “macroprudential” regulators that are responsible for
regulating employment and credit volume through interest rate policy. See Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Implementing a Macroprudential
Approach to Supervision and Regulation, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 2 (May 5, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf (“The systemic
orientation of the macroprudential approach may be contrasted with that of the traditional, or
‘microprudential,’ approach to regulation and supervision, which is concerned primarily with
the safety and soundness of individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures.”).
58See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, § 132 (adding § 39(a)–(d) to
the FDIA).
59See id.
664 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
judgments about what risk weights to apply to the entire spectrum of a
bank’s assets.60 In practical effect, the regulators are charged with design-
ing and implementing a regulatory system that identifies and remediates
excessive risk-taking and, should the system fail, ensuring swift interven-
tion to resolve the troubled institution.
The FDIC has the special responsibility under the prompt corrective
action regime,61 as well as the Dodd-Frank Act’s “orderly liquidation
authority,”62 for resolving insolvent depository institutions and systemically
important financial holding companies. The FSOC, for its part, is respon-
sible for identifying risks to financial stability, promoting market discipline,
and responding to emerging threats to financial stability.63 Of course, U.S.
banking regulators have a host of other responsibilities, such as monitor-
ing compliance with the Truth in Lending Act and the Community Rein-
vestment Act.64 These regulatory programs, while important, do not
present conditions where complexity capture is likely to occur. This article
focuses instead on the safety and soundness supervision, capital adequacy
regulation, and resolution responsibilities because these supervisory duties
require an understanding of risk in conditions of complexity.
C. What Does It Mean to Say a System Is “Complex”?
References to the complexity of social systems, including the contempo-
rary financial system, at times lack definitional clarity. In particular,
authors often fail to distinguish complexity from complicatedness. The
difference between complexity and complicatedness is nontrivial from the
perspective of financial regulation. Simplifying somewhat, complex
markets are not only complicated; they are also characterized by uncer-
tainty and unpredictability that call into question the continued viability
of public regulatory control over market activities. This section will
60See infra Part III.B (discussing generally applicable capital requirements as a behavior-based
regulatory tool); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 52, at 259–63 (summarizing how risk-
weighted assets are calculated).
61See infra note 287 (discussing prompt corrective action).
62Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, §§ 201–217, 124 Stat. 1376.
63See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
64See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 52, at 23.
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summarize some aspects of the burgeoning research programs of com-
plexity science and network effects. These fields of inquiry are vast, and I
will undertake the modest task of highlighting only certain of those aspects
that are most relevant to legal and regulatory scholarship.
At first blush it might appear strange to analyze financial institutions
and markets as networks and nodes in a complex system, but the analogy
is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Scholars of internet law,65 environ-
mental law,66 and telecommunications law67 have appreciated the implica-
tions of complexity theory on their work. In the economics field, the
connection between biological evolution, itself a complex process, and
economics has been appreciated for some time, albeit on the margins of
mainstream economic theory.68 The work of Thorstein Veblen represents
an important early rejection of equilibrium-based models of the economy
and an exploration of the emergent properties of economic activity.69
65See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 241–61 (2006); David G. Post & David
R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-
Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998).
66See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States:
Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex
Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997).
67See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity:
Providing Resilience Within the Rule of Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2008); Barbara A.
Cherry & Johannes Bauer, Adaptive Regulation: Contours of a Policy Model for the Internet
Economy, Address at the 15th Biennial Conference of the International Telecommunications
Society (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/berlin04/
Papers/Cherry_paper.pdf.
68On the marginal status of evolutionary economics within the academic economic establish-
ment, see Mark Perlman, Mind-Sets, and Why Veblen Was Ineffectual, in IS ECONOMICS AN
EVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE? 13, 13 (Francisco Louçã & Mark Perlman eds., 2000).
69See Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q. J. ECON. 373, 393
(1898) (“[A]n evolutionary economics must be the theory of a process of cultural growth as
determined by the economic interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic insti-
tutions stated in terms of the process itself.”); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, On the Evolution of
Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 415, 420–23 (1998) (discussing
Veblen’s relation to the concept of emergence and his conception of “the evolution and
selection of institutions as emergent entities in the socioeconomic sphere”); Geoffrey M.
Hodgson, Precursors of Modern Evolutionary Economics: Marx, Marshall, Veblen, and Schumpeter, in
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Veblen’s legacy today is carried on by a research program devoted entirely
to evolutionary economics.70 In 1950, economist Armen Alchian again
drew parallels between the economy and biological evolution.71 And in
1962, Herbert Simon wrote a paper in which he compared the economy to
complex, evolutionary systems.72 More recently, ecologist and complexity
theorist Bob May and colleagues observed in their improbably titled article
Ecology for Bankers that there is “common ground in analyzing financial
systems and ecosystems, especially in the need to identify conditions that
dispose a system to be knocked from seeming stability to another, less
happy state.”73 Brian Arthur of the Santa Fe Institute coined the term
“complexity economics” in the late 1990s,74 which later inspired McKinsey
EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 9, 20 (Richard W. England ed., 1994)
(describing how Veblen “characterized his own economics as post-Darwinian and argued that
economics should embrace the metaphor of evolution and change, rather than the static ideas
of equilibrium that had been borrowed from physics by the neoclassical economists”); infranote
100 and accompanying text (describing the importance of emergence to complexity science).
70See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 3–48 (1982) (advancing a theory of natural selection of firms and industries based on
their “organizational genetics” and comparing research and development expenditures to
genetic mutation); John Foster & Werner Hölzl, Introduction and Overview, in APPLIED EVOLU-
TIONARY ECONOMICS AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS 1, 1–2 (John Foster & Werner Hölzl eds., 2004)
(“Evolutionary economists see the economy as a scientific domain characterized by non-
equilibrium processes in which economic agents create and adapt to novelty through learning
rather than as a system in which there are disequilibrating shocks to stable equilibrium states.”).
71See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,
219–20 (1950). In particular, Alchian presented a microeconomic model according to which
firms had imperfect information and therefore were unable to use profit maximization as a
guide to action. These firms instead adopted their practices in light of observed profits at
other firms through “imitative, venturesome, innovative, trial-and-error adaptive behavior”
in a process analogous to biological evolution. Id.
72Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467, 468 (1962)
(“Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact
in a nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an
ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties
of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of
the whole.”).
73Robert M. May et al., Ecology for Bankers, 451 NATURE 893, 893 (2008).
74See W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107, 109 (1999) (“Complexity
economics is not a temporary adjunct to static economic theory but theory at a more general,
out-of-equilibrium level.”). Eric Beinhocker dates the phrase’s first usage to an earlier 1994
Arthur lecture. See ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND
THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 458 n.48 (2006).
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& Co. researcher Eric Beinhocker to publish a comprehensive account of
markets as complex systems.75 Complexity economics is gradually becom-
ing accepted in certain corners of the academy—for example, physics
departments are regularly awarding doctoral degrees to students who
write dissertations on economic matters.76 Most interesting from the per-
spective of legal and regulation scholars, financial regulators in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan separately have commissioned studies
by, and organized collaborative sessions with, complexity scientists in order
to appreciate the role of complexity in financial markets.77
1. Positive and Negative Feedback Mechanisms
Traditional financial economics is premised on equilibrium theory, which
posits that financial markets will settle at prices that allocate resources
optimally in satisfaction of individuals’ preference sets.78 The classic
75See BEINHOCKER, supra note 74.
76J. Doyne Farmer et al., Is Economics the Next Physical Science?, PHYSICS TODAY, Sept. 2005, at
37; see also BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 390–91 (describing the influx of “econophysicists”—
that is, physicists applying their skills to financial problems—to Wall Street after the end of the
Cold War due to their decreased demand in the defense industry).
77See, e.g., KIMMO SORAMÄKI ET AL., THE TOPOLOGY OF INTERBANK PAYMENT FLOWS, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 243, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/sr243.pdf (finding the U.S. financial payment system can be treated as
a specific example of a complex network); Hajime Inaoka et al., Fractal Network Derived from
Banking Transaction: An Analysis of Network Structures Formed by Financial Institutions (Bank of
Japan, Working Paper No. 04-E-04, 2004), available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/
wps_rev/wps_2004/data/wp04e04.pdf (presenting findings of a study using methods of sta-
tistical physicists to analyze network structures of financial transactions); David Aikman et al.,
Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Policy Making: Art or Science? 2 (Mar. 22, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript delivered to The Royal Society Conference on “Handling Uncertainty in
Science”), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech
432.pdf (mentioning a joint seminar between the United Kingdom’s Met (i.e., Meteorologi-
cal) Office and the Bank of England). For a scholarly account of the implications of
complexity theory on financial regulation, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalisation of
Law—The “Complex” Case of Bank Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING,
DECISION-MAKING, PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 3–37 (Mary E. Hiscock & William van Caenegem
eds., 2010).
78See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,
22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954). Economist Werner Hildenbrand is said to have referred to
general equilibrium theory as the “gothic cathedral” of economics. BEINHOCKER, supra note 74,
at 43.
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expression of this theory is the efficient capital markets hypothesis
(ECMH), according to which security prices reflect the impact of all pub-
licly available information on a security’s expected cash flows.79 The
ECMH is recognized by law; it undergirds much of the mandatory secu-
rities disclosure regime,80 and the U.S. Supreme Court has cited it in
relaxing the burden of proof in private securities fraud actions.81 Accord-
ing to equilibrium theory, the balance of financial markets is intermittently
upset by human events—such as wars, technology,82 political turmoil, and
other new information—that are outside, or exogenous to, the operation
of the markets; but markets will process the new information communi-
cated by such events and settle on a new equilibrium.83 According to this
theory, the economy is brought back to equilibrium through negative
feedback mechanisms, which act to restore a system’s equilibrium by pushing
the system back to its original state with a push that becomes stronger
the further the system has moved away from that state.84 This is Adam
Smith’s metaphorical “invisible hand,” which describes the same
79See Ronald G. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 554–65 (1984) (describing the “weak,” “semi-strong,” and “strong” forms of
the ECMH and noting that it “is now the context in which serious discussion of the regu-
lation of financial markets takes place”); Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regard-
ing Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (“[T]here is no other proposition in
economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis.”).
80See, e.g., Adoption of Integrated Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release Nos. 33–6383,
etc., 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382 n.9 (Jan. 4, 1982) (citing in support of the SEC’s integrated
disclosure regime the “premise that information regularly furnished to the marketplace . . .
may be reflected in the price of the outstanding securities”).
81See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff bringing
an action against an issuer under Rule 10b-5 is entitled to a presumption that it acted in
reliance of the defendant’s misrepresentations—one of the traditional elements of fraud—
because a plaintiff sells its shares into a market in which “most publicly available information
is reflected in market price”).
82Some economists argue that technology is endogenous to the economy and the source
of upward-trending growth, as new products and processes are formed from existing
technologies. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(1994).
83See BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 54–55.
84See LEN FISHER, CRASHES, CRISES, AND CALAMITIES: HOW WE CAN USE SCIENCE TO READ THE EARLY
WARNING-SIGNS 75 (2011).
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equilibrium-generating process at work in the economy,85 similar to what we
observe in other everyday contexts such as “cruise control” features in
automobiles and thermostat-controlled air conditioning. In recent decades,
financial economists waged intramural turf wars over whether to modify the
ECMH to account for the seemingly irrational behavior of investors, het-
erogeneous expectations, and the limits of arbitrage.86 Pure-form ECMH
skeptics had some success in poking holes in the ECMH edifice with their
“noise theory” arguments. But the fundamental premise of a capital market
that generally gets prices right due to smart investors applying negative
feedback pressure on mispriced capital assets remains a core precept of
traditional economic theory—whether one accepts ECMH or noise theory.87
85See EDGAR E. PETERS, PATTERNS IN THE DARK: UNDERSTANDING RISK AND FINANCIAL CRISIS WITH
COMPLEXITY THEORY 4 (1999). In a broad sense, even the market’s invisible hand can be
considered a complex ordering mechanism inasmuch as order emerges spontaneously without
formal coordination among transacting parties. See id. at 44. The ECMH takes it as a token of
faith, however, that the order thus emerging is stable, not subject to positive feedback effects,
network effects, and other endogenous properties. However, whether the emergent order is in
fact stable, depends, as discussed below in Part II.D.2, on the market structure.
86See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28
J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); cf. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 301 (2009) (“While
behaviorists and other critics have poked a lot of holes in the edifice of rational market
finance, they haven’t been willing to abandon that edifice. . . . [T]hey still trust that . . .
‘pervasive forces’ are out there somewhere, pushing prices at least in the general direction of
where they belong.”).
87Larry Cunningham identified the importance of nonlinear dynamics to securities regula-
tion early on and distinguished irrational investor behavior (so-called “noise trading”) from
nonlinear mechanics. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From RandomWalks to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994). In
particular, he notes that
the descriptive paradigm of ECMH efficiency versus noisy inefficiency and of ECMH
rationality versus noisy irrationality seem falsely constrained by a linear frame of refer-
ence. The system described is forced into a preconceived box defined in terms of relative
efficiency and relative rationality. The nonlinear reality forces the analysis out of this
preconceived box and into a multidimensional domain in which notions of rationality
and efficiency are only part of the whole story.
Id. at 603–04. Further, “[n]onlinear dependence goes beyond noise theory . . . to suggest that
there are deeper structural forces that affect public capital market outcomes that cannot be
explained by the psychological and emotional perspective of noise theory alone.” Id. at 592;
see also W. Brian Arthur et al., Asset Pricing Under Endogenous Expectations in an Artificial Stock
Market, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM II 15, 15–19 (W. Brian Arthur et al.
eds., 1997) (pointing out that while noise theory differs from rational expectations theory, it
also differs from complexity theory). Though Cunningham’s article focuses on chaos theory
and neither discusses complexity nor addresses network effects, it is an important early
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Recently, however, other economists and even physical scientists have
called equilibrium theory itself into question by conducting research on
economies and markets as complex systems.88 According to these new
models, individual firms can be conceptualized as semi-autonomous agents
that process information,89 interact, and adapt in a system of financial
endeavor to improve financial regulatory structures by taking into account nonlinear market
dynamics. On the general difference between complexity and chaos, see ROBERT AXELROD &
MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY: ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC
FRONTIER xv (1999).
88See BEINHOCKER, supra note 74. The novelty of this research program stems from its experi-
mental methods and ability to harness computing power to simulate large numbers of
agent-based interactions. The theoretical foundations of general equilibrium theory have
been under attack for over a century. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Veblen’s objections to equilibrium-based economic theories). Both the Keynesian and
Austrian economics traditions have squared off with equilibrium theory as well. See GEORGE
COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT
MARKET FALLACY 13–14 (2008) (describing Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis”
and its debt to Keynes); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 35 (1948) (“I
have long felt that the concept of equilibrium itself and the methods which we employ in pure
analysis have a clear meaning only when confined to the analysis of the action of a single
person and that we are really passing into a different sphere and silently introducing a new
element of altogether different character when we apply it to the explanation of the inter-
actions of a number of different individuals.”); JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 249–54 (Harvest/Harcourt 1964) (1953) (explaining how
the “environment and psychological propensities of the modern world” result in prices and
business cycles that are only “moderately stable”); Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure
as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model,
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 369 (2009) (“The microeconomic fixations of today’s law and
economics school have replaced [the] comprehensive Keynesian model of financial regulation
. . . [with] a neoclassical equilibrium model that is highly abstract and mathematical, often
based on unrealistic assumptions and ignorant of historical contexts and the many complex
dynamics and interdependencies of human behavior and market psychology.”); Israel M.
Kirzner, On the Method of Austrian Economics, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECO-
NOMICS 40, 40 (Edwin G. Dolan ed., 1976) (“Austrian economists are subjectivists; they
emphasize the purposefulness of human action; they are unhappy with constructions that
emphasize equilibrium to the exclusion of market processes . . . .”).
89The main actors in financial markets are legal entities such as corporations and limited
liability companies. These entities are themselves constellations of separate stakeholder
agents, such as stockholders, workers (and their labor unions), bond holders and other
creditors, tort claimants, customers, suppliers, managers, and executives. The allocation of
decision-making power among these stakeholders will impact a firm’s reactions to stimuli,
such that the same event might trigger two very different reactions for two for-profit corpo-
rations organized under the same statutes and operating in the same markets. These intra-
corporate networks complicate further—or perhaps complexify is the better word—the
assessment of financial market outcomes.
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markets in response to one another and to external environment inputs.90
The agents in a complex system have the ability to adapt to and evolve in
a changing environment on a continual, rolling basis, such that predicted
behavioral responses are inherently unreliable due to the inability to know
how other agents within the system will react.91 Complex systems are
characterized by extensive, idiosyncratic, and nonlinear interdependence
of their agents.92 These interactions are often poorly understood.93 In
contrast to what occurs in equilibrium systems, change arises endog-
enously, not exogenously. These systems are also susceptible to positive
feedback effects, which, in contrast with negative feedback’s equilibrium
vector, increasingly drive systems to change at a continuously accelerating
rate.94 As such, unpredictable outcomes are a hallmark of complex,
adaptive systems.95
By contrast, traditional general equilibrium economics assumes that
positive feedback mechanisms and their resulting nonlinearities do not
impact market behavior. If any such forces are at work, they are washed
out by the predominance of negative feedback mechanisms, such as arbi-
trage, that push prices back to their equilibrium levels.96 Scholars have
pointed out that the theory relies on concepts, such as perfect competition,
market liquidity, no-arbitrage and market completeness, that foreclose
completely any consideration of the feedback effects of trading strategies
90See BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 18 (“Scientists refer to parts or particles that have the
ability to process information and adapt their behavior as agents and call the systems that
agents interact in complex adaptive systems.”); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 885, 887 (2008).
91See Arthur, supra note 74, at 108 (applauding recent forays by economists into the study of
“how actions, strategies, or expectations might react in general to (might endogenously
change with) the aggregate patterns these create”).
92See THOMAS A. BASS, THE PREDICTORS 68 (1999).
93See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 9 (2d ed.
1999) (“In complex industrial, space, and military systems, the normal accident generally (not
always) means that the interactions are not only unexpected, but are incomprehensible for some
critical period of time.”).
94See FISHER, supra note 84, at xv.
95See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 87, at 11–15; PERROW, supra note 2, at 260 (“A truly complex
system may be impossible to fully comprehend, and the unexpected interactions may not ap-
pear for a very long time, and especially not in the short period before [rolling out a system].”).
96See Arthur, supra note 74, at 108.
672 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
and market dynamics.97 By simplifying their questions, equilibrium econo-
mists obtain precise and clear answers.98 But if the economy is a complex
system, this precision comes at the cost of accuracy.99
Those seeking to understand complex systems must understand not
only the attributes—and motivations, in the case of social systems—of
agents, but also the ways by which properties of the system emerge from
positive feedback mechanisms.100 Emergence in this sense connotes some-
thing more than the aggregate of individual agent contributions, such as
the sum of a number of small weights tipping a scale.101 Emergent system
attributes are nonlinear102 and may emerge suddenly and without warning
in what physicists refer to as “phase transitions.”103
97See Fabio Caccioli et al., Eroding Market Stability by Proliferation of Financial Instruments, 71 EUR.
PHYS. J. B 467, 467 (2009).
98See FOX, supra note 86, at 301 (attributing traditional economics’ tendency to make simpli-
fying assumptions so to achieve precise answers to its heavy borrowing from nineteenth
century physics); Arthur, supra note 74, at 107 (“Conventional economic theory chooses not
to study the unfolding of the patterns its agents create but rather to simplify its questions in
order to seek analytical solutions.”); Farmer et al., supra note 76, at 40 (“The hypothesis of
rational choice, in contrast, has the great virtue of parsimony. It makes strong predictions
from simple hypotheses and, in that sense, is more like a physics theory.”).
99See Foster & Hölzl, supra note 70, at 5 (“The great task is to provide a universally valid set
of principles that can offer simple representation of the structures and processes in the real
economy—not principles that avoid confronting this reality but those that acknowledge the
fact that we are dealing with complex systems and related complex processes. By definition,
such a set of principles is orthogonal to conventional ones as embodied, for example, in
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Such a theory is simplistic . . . .”).
100See JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 2 (1998) (“We are everywhere
confronted with emergence in complex adaptive systems—ant colonies, networks of neurons,
the immune system, the Internet, and the global economy, to name a few—where the
behavior of the whole is much more complex than the behavior of the parts.”).
101See ANDY CLARK, MINDWARE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
112–17 (2001).
102See HOLLAND, supra note 100, at 121–22 (“Emergence is above all a product of coupled,
context-dependent interactions. Technically these interactions, and the resulting system, are
nonlinear: The behavior of the overall system cannot be obtained by summing the behaviors of
the constituent parts.”).
103The analogous concept in evolutionary biology of “punctuated equilibrium” is also relevant
here. As positive feedback pushes a complex system to undergo a phase transition, the system
settles on a new equilibrium point until a subsequent phase transition. See BEINHOCKER, supra
note 74, at 173 (discussing the relevance of Steven Jay Gould’s concept of punctuated
equilibrium to economic analysis); cf. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
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2. Complex Systems and Network Effects
The tendency of a complex system to slip into catastrophe depends on the
characteristics of the interconnections of the nodes of the networks that
comprise the system—what network scientists refer to as the networks’
topology.104 In particular, complexity scientists look to (1) the number of the
network’s nodes; (2) the density of the nodal interconnections;105 and
(3) the regularity in the behavior of the nodes.106
Complexity science teaches that network effects are at once a source
of tremendous productive and scalable possibilities and a source of chaos
and instability. An increase in a company’s workforce from 10 to 100 is one
order of magnitude—in other words, the exponent in the quantity 101 (10)
is greater than the exponent in the quantity 102 (100) by one. But this
simple ninety-employee increase causes the number of possible employee
relationships to increase by many trillions. To the extent that employee
collaboration is correlated with outcome improvements, the firm experi-
ences a nonlinear scaling up of its productive and creative possibilities. But
the qualification that improved outcomes are correlated with increases in
interactivity is the key assumption. In complex systems, a minor change in
one network node—or one component of the subsystem, and so forth—
can cause catastrophic changes in the system’s behavior.107
To illustrate, consider a complicated, serial—but ultimately linear
and noncomplex— system like an assembly line manufacturing process. If
a screw comes loose in an equipment component in a way that causes
the equipment edge to scrape the product as it makes its way through the
manufacturing process, system managers and engineers will notice the
scratched but otherwise as-designed end products and will trace the defect
109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 663–65 (1996) (applying Gould’s punctuated equilibrium theory to
legal regimes governing corporate finance).
104Network Topology, ATIS TELECOM GLOSSARY, http://www.atis.org/glossary/definition.aspx?id=
3516 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
105Biologists refer to the interconnectedness of an organism’s genes as “epistasis.” See STUART
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 170 (1995).
106See BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 148.
107See KAUFFMAN, supra note 105, at 152; PERROW, supra note 93, at 86 (“In complex systems,
removing a component or shutting it down means temporarily severing numerous ties with
consequent readjustments, capping, product storage, removal to get access, and reconfigu-
rations because parts and units tend to be multiply linked.”).
674 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
to the faulty screw. Managers will know which of the numerous system
components might cause such a defect because they will know how each
component interacts with the components that follow it in a direct
sequence. Even if this linear manufacturing process were comprised of
thousands of steps, it would be neither interactively complex nor charac-
terized by significant network effects.108 On its own, numerosity of nodal
connections does not lead to complexity.
Now contrast that process with dynamic, interactive systems such as
the human immune system, a nuclear power plant, an ecosystem, or a
large corporation with different departments and divisions, in which
system components require coordination to function optimally. As the
nodal interrelatedness of a network increases, it becomes subject to what
complexity theorists refer to as “conflicting constraints,” which describes
the inability to simultaneously promote competing and contradictory pri-
orities that are linked together.109 As a result of conflicting constraints, it
becomes more difficult to manage the enhanced productive possibilities
optimally.110 Biologist Stuart Kauffman has vividly described this phenom-
enon in the evolutionary context as a “complexity catastrophe.”111 An
unexpected event in one component can cause a cascade of events, or a
positive feedback loop, that undermines the system’s effectiveness and may
even push the system into chaos.112 Writing about complex, human-
engineered systems such as nuclear power plant management, cultural
108See RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 155–56 (2007) (discussing how post office activities constitute
a complicated but ultimately linear process); KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE,
MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 90–92 (2d ed.
2007).
109BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 158 (“A small change in one part of the network . . . [leads]
to cascades of change and [makes] it impossible to predict . . . patterns. . . . In an organiza-
tional context, it is these cascades of change that then run into conflicting constraints.”).
110See KAUFFMAN, supra note 105, at 173 (“Because so many constraints are in conflict, there is
a large number of rather modest compromise solutions rather than an obvious superb
solution.”).
111See STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELECTION IN
EVOLUTION 52, 71–74, 216–18 (1993).
112See KAUFFMAN, supra note 105, at 173 (“As the density of the interconnections increases,
changing a single gene (or bit in the program) will have effects that ripple throughout the
system.”).
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anthropologist Constance Perin described the conflicting constraints
problem as an “infrastructure of conundrums.”113
Regarding the regularity of the network’s nodes, complexity scien-
tists refer to the bias of network nodes to denote their tendency to create
orderly outcomes in spite of their high connectivity. The intuition is
straightforward: no matter how many interconnected nodes a network
has, if the behavior of the nodes is predictable, then they will tend to be
more orderly than if their behavior were random. As Kauffman puts it,
“‘homogeneity clusters’ of elements that have frozen values link with one
another and percolate across the network” as the “dynamic behavior of the
network becomes a web of frozen elements and functionally isolated
islands of changeable elements.”114 In other words, network equilibrium
and order are more likely to emerge when nodes behave predictably
rather than randomly—according to “frozen” behavioral patterns.
There is some evidence that “disassortive” networks—that is, networks
where nodes exhibit a bias to be connected to dissimilar nodes—are more
resilient.115
3. “Normal Accidents” and the Problem with “Tightly Coupled”
System Components
Not only are complex network systems prone to unpredictable behavior,
the seeds of their destruction may be sown in their initial properties.
Sociologist Charles Perrow maintains that systems characterized by inter-
active complexity and tight coupling among the system’s components are
subject to what he terms “normal accidents.”116 If “normal accident”
sounds like a contradiction in terms, it should not. “Accident” only con-
tradicts “normal” to the extent that the examined system’s normal state is
equilibrium; where, however, a system is volatile and unstable, the contra-
diction disappears. Perrow describes a network as “tightly coupled” when
its nodes are critically interdependent; the networked system is unable to
113See CONSTANCE PERIN, SHOULDERING RISKS: THE CULTURE OF CONTROL IN THE NUCLEAR POWER
INDUSTRY 263 (2004).
114Stuart Kauffman, Antichaos and Adaptation, SCI. AM., Aug. 1991, at 78.
115See May et al., supra note 73, at 893–94 (tying disassortivity to the concept of modularity,
which is discussed infra in Part III.A).
116See PERROW, supra note 93, at 7–9 (introducing the concept of “normal accident”).
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stop or counteract processes, or add substitutes or replacements.117 With
tightly coupled systems, the consequences of failure in one subsystem
quickly stress or overcome a related subsystem.118 They are highly respon-
sive to shocks, and their responses to disturbances may be disastrous.119
Consider, for example, the experience of the transport planes that
dropped members of the U.S. Airborne divisions behind enemy lines in
the early morning hours before the D-Day amphibious assault on Nazi-
occupied Normandy.120 The paratrooper drop proved largely ineffective
due to an unexpected event, which caused an operational failure that
ramified quickly through tightly coupled system components. In other
words, a normal accident occurred.
Paratroop drops are complex systems that rely on coordinating mul-
tiple components in conditions of meteorological and military uncertainty.
In this case, D-Day planners sent over eight hundred transport planes
across the channel from the United Kingdom, each laden with eighteen
paratroopers, who were to jump out at a height of approximately 600–700
feet.121 The paratroopers needed to be dropped in a concentrated area in
order to be able to coordinate operations, so the planes flew in a tight
“V-of-V” formation to ensure they did not separate.122 To eliminate the
possibility of the enemy intercepting radio transmissions, there was no
communication between the planes and command or among the planes
themselves. After arriving in pitch-black Normandy skies with the V-of-V
formation intact, the pilots encountered an unexpected event—a dense
low-altitude cloud formation.123 Several planes diverted slightly from the
117See PERROW, supra note 2, at 261; BOOKSTABER, supra note 108, at 144 (“Tight coupling means
that components of a process are critically interdependent; they are linked with little room for
error or time for recalibration or adjustment.”).
118See PERROW, supra note 2, at 262; PERROW, supra note 93, at 89–90 (“[T]ight coupling is a
mechanical term meaning there is no slack or buffer or give between two items. What
happens in one directly affects what happens in the other.” (alteration omitted)).
119PERROW, supra note 93, at 92.
120See MAX HASTINGS, OVERLORD: D-DAY AND THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 73–75 (1984); JOHN
KEEGAN, SIX ARMIES IN NORMANDY: FROM D-DAY TO THE LIBERATION OF PARIS 69–93 (1982).
121KEEGAN, supra note 120, at 76.
122Id. at 80–82.
123See id. at 83. The secrecy of the D-Day planning made the operation more complex. An
earlier reconnaissance mission had flown the same route of the paratroop drop and had
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formation, which caused still other planes to alter their course to avoid
mid-air collisions with the out-of-formation, but still nearby, planes.124
Before long, the V-of-V formation had disintegrated and without the
benefit of nearby planes as points-of-reference, pilots found themselves
flying blind. The paratroopers were dropped in a haphazard, uncoordi-
nated fashion—both in terms of coordinates and altitude—with disastrous
results, as most paratroopers found themselves too far from their intended
drop zones to conduct their operations.125 Scores of less fortunate para-
troopers were dropped into flooded lowlands where they drowned laden
with their own equipment126 or died from impact after having been
dropped from altitudes too low for parachutes to deploy.127
Though the complexity of the planes’ V-of-V networked formation
was in itself modest when compared with most social systems, the interac-
tions between the unexpected shock that the dense cloud formation pre-
sented and the elaborate aerial formation posed a threat to the operation.
encountered the same clouds. However, due to the ban on radio transmissions the informa-
tion could not be communicated to the incoming pilots and no measures were taken to bolster
the operation’s resilience—or, stated differently, to reduce the tightness of the coupling of the
operation’s components—by, for instance, increasing the distance between planes. See STEVEN
J. ZALOGA, D-DAY 1944 (2): UTAH BEACH AND THE US AIRBORNE LANDINGS 28–29 (2004).
124See DAVID BELCHEM, VICTORY IN NORMANDY 78 (1981) (“While the cloud did reduce aircraft
casualties[,] . . . it seriously upset navigation, and this factor, combined with the exaggerated
evasive action of the pilots, greatly increased the difficulty and hazards of jumping.”); NAPIER
CROOKENDEN, DROPZONE NORMANDY: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH AIRBORNE ASSAULT
ON D-DAY 1944, at 81 (1976) (noting also how enemy fire aggravated confusion caused by
clouds and resulted in pilots taking evasive action as “rolling, pitching aircraft knocked many
men off their feet” at the precise moment they required a “steady jump platform”); KEEGAN,
supra note 120, at 83 (“This bank of cloud, unpredicted and probably unpredictable by the
meteorologists, stood across the approach routes of both the 82nd and the 101st. . . . Pilots
instinctively separated, horizontally and vertically, so that the tight V’s of V’s dissolved . . . .”);
ZALOGA, supra note 123, at 29.
125See BELCHEM, supra note 124, at 78 (“The troops of 101 Division were scattered over a wide
area, and by dawn only 1,100 paratroops had reached their rendezvous points out of a total
of 6,600”); CROOKENDEN, supra note 124, at 81–83, 113–17 (chronicling how most paratroopers
in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions fell far afield of their intended drop zones);
HASTINGS, supra note 120, at 74–75 (noting that wide dispersion of paratroopers had fortu-
itous, if unintended, consequence of “bringing confusion and uncertainty to the Germans
across the whole breadth of the Cherbourg peninsula”).
126HASTINGS, supra note 120, at 74.
127See KEEGAN, supra note 120, at 88.
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Moreover, the tight aerial formation, the lack of communication, and the
narrow target drop area were tightly coupled and ensured there was little to
no slack available with which to manage the interaction between the clouds
and the formation. Tight coupling prevented any kind of stop lever.128
Perrow, in his own work concerning the North American electricity
grid, has documented the results of tight coupling of long-distance elec-
tricity transmission lines following deregulation of electricity production
and transmission in the United States.129 According to Perrow, deregula-
tion has made the grid network more susceptible to catastrophic failure by
requiring owners of transmission lines to offer to transmit competitors’
electricity across their lines.130 Prior to deregulation, the grid infrastruc-
ture was localized and had weak connections across long distances.131 It
consisted of clumps of networks that glommed onto one another as power
needs grew. With the reform, the few inter-regional, long-distance lines
were supposed to allow for excess electricity to be transferred from low-
price markets to high-price markets, in the process achieving greater price
uniformity in a national market for electricity.132 The stability of the grid
was made to depend, then, on the reliable function of the long-distance
transmission lines; local electricity transmission became tightly coupled to
long-distance lines. The pre-reform system, it must be admitted, was
characterized by lower price uniformity,133 but it possessed redundancies
and modularity that, as discussed below in Part III, are important in
maintaining a system’s resilience in the face of unpredicted events. Perrow
describes the grid’s present network structure as less reliable and more
vulnerable than before deregulation.134
The D-Day and electricity grid examples demonstrate how the char-
acteristics of a network’s interconnections can give rise to vulnerability to
128Cf. BOOKSTABER, supra note 108, at 256 (attributing the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
nuclear power plant disasters and the 1996 Valujet crash to “tight coupling from one link to
the next[, which] precluded any kind of stop lever”).
129See PERROW, supra note 2, at 211–47.
130Id. at 227–29, 231–34.
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perturbation. By focusing on dense interconnectivity and the tight coupling
of nodes as destabilizing factors, Perrow provides a useful conceptual frame-
work with which to consider the vulnerabilities of other complex systems.
D. Contemporary Financial Markets as Complex Systems
The next question to address is whether, and in what respects, contempo-
rary financial markets are properly characterized as complex systems with
tightly coupled system components. If financial markets are complex
systems, regulators face formidable challenges in implementing their
statutory objectives of promoting systemic stability and the safety and
soundness of the institutions transacting in those markets. In fact, they
might even have to become familiar with the science of complexity.135 Most
worrisome from the standpoint of financial regulation, financial network
effects might result in the emergence—that is, the development of
attributes that are impossible to discern ex ante by observing the behavior
of individual agents—of negative externalities such as systemic risk. Most
of the legal and economic scholarship devoted to systemic risk inquires
into traditional microeconomic issues such as the moral hazard resulting
from government safety nets. Though this incentive- and behavior-related
scholarship is critically important, recent events and research suggest that
the network structure of the financial system merits more attention as a
regulatory problem than it currently receives.136 While network theory is
silent about behavioral considerations, it is “particularly well suited for
dealing with heterogeneity of agents, charting the dynamic propagation of
shocks within the financial system and identifying the non-linearities that
characterise financial instability in a parsimonious way.”137
135See Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128 S. AFR. L.J. 253,
257–64 (2011); Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Why Banks Failed
the Stress Test, Speech at Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress Testing 5 (Feb. 9–10, 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090219d.pdf.
136See Erland Nier et al., Network Models and Financial Stability, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL
2033, 2034 (2007) (“A number of determinants of systemic failure, including the role of . . .
government safety nets[,] have been studied extensively in the literature. . . . However,
relatively little is known about how the structure of a banking network may affect its suscep-
tibility to systemic breakdown.”).
137Prasanna Gai et al., Complexity, Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONETARY ECON. 453, 454
(2011).
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For financial regulators in charge of systemic financial stability, such
as the newly formed FSOC,138 care must be given to forecast phase tran-
sitions during which new propensities to instability and contagion
emerge. Even safety and soundness regulators whose supervisory respon-
sibilities are limited to individual institutions, such as the OCC and the
FDIC, must attune themselves to the effects of these risks on the firms
they supervise. The viability of public regulatory control may be at stake.
This section takes up this question by (1) presenting a qualitative assess-
ment of the networks across which financial business is conducted in
order to illustrate their complexity and the tight coupling of their nodes
and (2) summarizing some computer-based experimental studies that
suggest that contemporary financial markets do in fact behave like
complex systems.
1. A Qualitative Assessment of Financial Networks
The discussion below describes how the contemporary financial system
becomes interactively complex as a result of its network structure. In it, I
provide some concrete illustrations of certain attributes of the financial
system that are susceptible to positive feedback, nonlinear phase transi-
tions, and normal accidents, as well as the networks through which those
events are propagated. In particular, I focus here on legal entity networks,
market networks, and the network effects of regulation and uniform
trading strategies. These descriptions set the stage for the subsequent
summary of certain computer-based experimental studies demonstrating
that such events can in fact occur and propagate through the system.
a. Legal entity networks. The emergence of the large financial conglom-
erate means that financial businesses are conducted across dense and
elaborate networks of legal entities. Sixteen large, complex financial con-
glomerates identified by the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of
England have 2.5 times more majority-owned subsidiaries than the
sixteen largest multinational manufacturing firms.139 Of these financial
conglomerates, eight have over 1000 majority-owned subsidiaries, and
138See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
139Richard J. Herring, Wind-Down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts 3 (PEW Econ. Pol’y Grp.
Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 15, 2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/
fic/policy%20page/Wind-down-plans-formatted-final-2–25–10–1.pdf.
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one—Citigroup—has nearly 2500 majority-owned subsidiaries.140 Though
data are not available, the numbers would increase significantly if minority
interests in subsidiaries and the real, if often extralegal, affiliations with
off-balance sheet financing vehicles such as securitization special-purpose
entities, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, and structured invest-
ment vehicles are counted.141 In addition to the web of legal relationships,
the affiliates are likely linked together through cross-affiliate credit and
business relationships and reputational goodwill.142 As a theoretical matter,
conglomerates economize on capital costs by forming separately shielded
subsidiaries because creditors will extend credit on better terms if they are
assured liquidation priority and legal protection from corporate parents
distributing the subsidiaries’ assets.143 But this efficiency can come at a cost
in the form of uncertainty where conglomerate structures are complex
enough to cause confusion regarding the ultimate owners of the conglom-
erate’s assets. Adding to this increased uncertainty is the interposition of a
multilevel management structure for each legal entity and business line. As
a former Citigroup risk manager explained, this accretion of management
structures “put[s] distance between data gatherers and users in senior
management,” and as a result “information gets lost in the compression
and transmission of the data.”144 This discussion recalls the conflicting
constraints problem discussed earlier,145 and it is not difficult to imagine
140Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial Con-
glomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BANKING 195, 200 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2010).
141One of the first steps for a junior corporate lawyer working on a mergers-and-acquisitions
transaction is to prepare a “corporate structure chart” that shows the relationships between
affiliates in the target company group. As a junior attorney charged with putting together a
structure chart of AIG for clients contemplating bids for AIG assets in the aftermath of its
September 2008 bailout and restructuring, I can attest from personal experience to the
massive complexity of financial conglomerate legal structure. The AIG structure chart—
which was subject to a de minimis exception and did not include all majority-owned
subsidiaries—folded out to span approximately four feet by four feet. It was double-sided.
142See Herring & Carmassi, supra note 140, at 217.
143See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNC-
TIONAL APPROACH 6–7 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the protections creditors obtain from entity
shielding).
144BOOKSTABER, supra note 108, at 126–27.
145See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
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how an instance of defective data transmission regarding, for example, a
large-volume buy or sell order might precipitate a complexity catastrophe
within the corporate group.
It seems a safe assumption that the complex network of legal enti-
ties generally responds rationally to organizational demands to minimize
regulatory, tax, and capital costs. Nevertheless, an unwelcome side-effect
of these linkages and uncertainties is that they significantly complicate
resolution of insolvent financial firms, which is one of the central tasks of
financial regulators—especially those charged with supervising large con-
glomerates posing systemic risks. In particular, the cross-jurisdictional
operations of conglomerates, conducted through hundreds or perhaps
thousands of subsidiaries and affiliates, complicate efforts to coordinate
resolution of a failing firm. While operations have internationalized, poli-
tics remain solidly local, and judicial or administrative authorities
charged with resolving such a firm will rush to ringfence and liquidate
assets subject to their jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, an orderly
liquidation will likely prove impossible, which will cause the disappear-
ance of a key market participant and, more importantly, massive liqui-
dations of positions that will cause asset values to decline. This is the
Lehman Brothers problem.146 Moreover, this problem of cross-
jurisdictional conglomerate resolution illustrates how corporate structure
complexity interacts dynamically with risk exposure complexity: as a
single business unit’s risk exposures cause financial stress in one part of
Conglomerate A, the inability to unwind that business unit in an orderly
manner can cause Conglomerate A itself to come under stress, which can
in turn spill over to business units within Conglomerates B and C that
rely on Conglomerate A for liquidity.147
b. Market networks. In today’s financial systems, an intricate web of
contractual obligations links the balance sheets of a wide variety of inter-
mediaries, such as banks and hedge funds, into a network structure. Both
the number and interrelatedness of the nodes in financial market networks
have increased dramatically in quantity since the 1980s, in the process
146See infra note 240 (discussing the Lehman Brothers collapse).
147See infra notes 215–18 and accompanying text (describing the contagion effects of “liquidity
hoarding”).
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introducing unpredictable contagions and spillover effects.148 The advent
of “sophisticated” financial instruments that comprise networks of claims
in their own right—such as securitized debt,149 credit default swaps (CDSs),
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—has heightened the complex-
ity of these balance sheet connections still further.150 Eric Beinhocker has
observed that “the networks of the economic world are arranged in hier-
archies of networks within networks,” which is particularly true of the
financial sector.151
Gone are the days when the banking business consisted merely of
accepting deposits, paying interest, and making loans.152 Today’s business
of banking—defined to mean what banks actually do—consists not only of
traditional deposit-taking and lending but also of CDOs, CDSs, securitiza-
tion, interbank transactions such as securities lending and repurchasing,
loan syndication, fixed income trading (primarily in derivatives markets),
and warehouse lending and custody-and-advisory services to hedge funds,
mutual funds, and mortgage lenders. And more recently, the network of
participants in these new markets, particularly the securitization market,
expanded to include money market funds, securities firms, and issuers of
148See infra Part II.D.2.
149Securitization describes the process by which loans or other financial obligations are
transferred to a separate legal entity that issues securities to be paid out of the proceeds of the
cash flows associated with the underlying transferred assets. See Kenneth C. Kettering,
Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1553, 1564–66 (2008).
150Prassana Gai & Sujit Kapadia, Contagion in Financial Networks, 466 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL SOC’Y
A 2401, 2401 (2010). Related to the development of new financial instruments is the broader
phenomenon of financial disintermediation, understood as the marginalization of financial
institutions in the process of converting savings into investment, which has resulted in the
development of numerous new, interconnected, and decentralized capital market networks.
For an authoritative discussion of the economic roots of financial disintermediation, see
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 225–406 (2002).
Prominent examples of disintermediation include the development of corporate bond,
mutual fund, commercial paper, and securitization financing channels.
151BEINHOCKER, supra note 74, at 141.
152During these sleepier days of banking, bank executives were said to follow the “3–6–3 rule,”
according to which they accepted deposits bearing three percent interest, made loans at six
percent interest, and hit the golf course by 3 p.m. See John R. Walter, The 3–6–3 Rule: Urban
Myth?, 92 ECON. Q.–FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND 51, 51 (2006).
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commercial paper.153 Andy Haldane of the Bank of England identified the
proliferation of securitization transactions as a prime culprit in the
ramping up of interconnectedness:
Securitisation increased the dimensionality, and thus complexity, of the finan-
cial network. Nodes grew in size and interconnections between them multi-
plied. The financial cat’s-cradle became dense and opaque. As a result, the
precise source and location of underlying claims became anyone’s guess.
Follow-the-leader became blind-man’s bluff. In short, diversification strategies
by individual firms generated heightened uncertainty across the system as a
whole.154
Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel colorfully describe the credit
default swap corner of the securitization world as “creat[ing] multilateral
exposure through daisy chains of liability, in which one swap seller’s ability
to meet its CDS obligations to a buyer depends on another seller’s solvency
down the line.”155
Figure 2 below, taken from a Bank of England paper, illustrates the
increasing interconnectedness of the global financial sector from 1985 to
the most recent credit crisis in 2008.156 The nodes in the graphs represent
countries, while the links reflect the cross-border banking claims between
them. The thickness of the links reflects the amounts of these claims.
The diagram illustrates the rapid increases in the density of the
interconnections since the 1980s. For those who have kept apace of recent
153See Hyun Song Shin, Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System 2 fig.3 (Bank
of Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 304, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
work304.pdf.
154Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking the Financial
Network, Speech Delivered at the Financial Student Association 7 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf.
155KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY
FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 219 (2011) (emphasis added). A CDS contract is like an insurance
contract on a debt security; the buyer pays a fee in exchange for a promise from the seller to
become liable for the loss should the obligor of the debt security default. See Viral V. Acharya
et al., Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 251, 254 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) [here-
inafter RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY].
156Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., On Tackling the Credit Cycle and
Too Big to Fail, Presentation at the Inst. of Int’l and European Affairs, slide 13 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.iiea.com/event/download_powerpoint?urlKey=andrew-haldane-on-
fixing-finance (reprinted with permission).
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financial market developments, this is hardly surprising; a full two-thirds
of the increase in bank balance sheets in recent years has taken the form of
claims against other financial institutions.157 The recent credit bubble that
burst in 2007–2008 occurred predominantly within the banking sector, as
most of the borrowed money failed to reach the “real” economy. Some
provocative “cognitive capitalism” critiques go so far as to suggest that the
increased prevalence of trading of leveraged financial claims among finan-
cial institutions has obliterated the distinction between the real and finan-
cial sectors of the economy; on this theory, the rearrangement of financial
157See Gai et al., supra note 137, at 456 fig.3 (showing that financial corporate debt comprised
approximately two-thirds of credit growth in the United Kingdom from 2003 to 2007);
Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469 NATURE 351,
351 (2011).
Figure 2. Interbank Network Connectivity Balloons (1985–2008).
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claims—via derivatives and securitization—is a pillar of the postindustrial
economy.158
These interfirm networks are not only opaque; they are also tightly
coupled—which frustrates attempts by regulators, or anyone else, to
understand their system dynamics. As discussed above, Perrow’s normal
accident theory predicts that such systems are bound to fail catastrophi-
cally.159 Examples of complex and tightly coupled financial markets
abound. For example, a bank seeking to hedge against risk exposure to
subprime mortgage-related assets must take a position that is inversely
correlated with subprime mortgages.160 The market for derivative instru-
ments relating to subprime mortgages is illiquid, so the bank would instead
need to take a short position in an asset that is correlated with subprime
mortgages, such as high-yield bonds. Thus, the bank obtains its hedge by
shorting high-yield bonds or purchasing protection in the high-yield bond
derivative market. Either hedge would push high-yield bond prices down
and yields up, raising the cost of financing for sub-investment-grade bor-
rowers.161 In the process, problems in the mortgage market ramify
through the financial system via derivatives to raise interest rates and
possibly create financial strain for borrowers relying on capital in the
seemingly unrelated high-yield debt market.
The May 6, 2010, “flash crash” provides a more dramatic example of
a normal accident in financial markets. In that episode, major equity
indexes in futures and securities markets plunged five to six percent in a
matter of minutes, only to recover those losses almost as quickly.162 Some
158See generally CHRISTIAN MARAZZI, THE VIOLENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 26–42 (2011) (dis-
cussing the “financialization” of the “post-Fordist” global economy and critiquing the division
between the “real” manufacturing economy and the leveraged financial business model that
contributes to large shares of corporate profits and gross domestic product).
159See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
160See Aline van Duyn, Subprime’s Toxic Spill Is Still Capable of Contamination, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 18,
2011, at 11.
161For an explanation for how the price of credit derivatives affects borrowers’ cost of credit,
see Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance 13–14 (Cornell L. Sch., Res. Paper
No. 011–04, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1760488.
162U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (CFTC) & U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FIND-
INGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 1–6 (2010), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (summarizing events responsible
for May 6, 2010, “flash crash”).
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individual stocks dropped much further, such as Accenture plc, which
declined from about $40 to $0.01 in seven seconds.163 According to the joint
CFTC-SEC report on the matter, a single equity-index futures sell order
from a mutual fund caused the crash. The culprit sell order was large and
executed through an automated execution algorithm that executed sales on
the exchange in increments that were calibrated to the total volume of
trading in the market for the subject futures contract.164 The order was
executed rapidly over twenty minutes because increased market volatility
resulted in higher-than-expected trading volumes. The high trading
volumes, however, were not due to deep liquidity—in other words, many
willing buyers and sellers—but rather a more limited subset of high-
frequency traders (HFTs) executing rapid automated trades without taking
meaningful long or short positions.165 So the rate of execution of the mutual
fund’s sell order, which was tied to trading volumes, ramped up as volumes
increased, selling into a market where, because liquidity was sparse, there
were very few willing buyers. The result was a sudden and marked decrease
in the price of the subject equity-index futures contract that was “cor-
rected”—that is, counteracted by negative feedback pressure—only after
the sell order was completed. The high-volume, low-liquidity trading
strategy of the HFTs interacted dynamically with the structure of the futures
trade, temporarily bouncing the market outside equilibrium. Little slack
existed in instant-execution trading markets so trade orders—and even
trading strategies—become tightly coupled.
Another set of tightly coupled transactions caused the futures
indexes’ volatility to cascade through the stock markets themselves. The
anomalous events occurring in the equity futures market triggered built-in
pauses in the automated trading systems used by investment banks
and hedge funds that provide much of stock market liquidity.166 As risk
163Id. at 83.
164Id. at 2.
165The report defines high-frequency traders as “proprietary trading firms that use high
speed systems to monitor market data and submit large numbers of orders to the markets.”
They “utilize quantitative and algorithmic methodologies to maximize the speed of their
market access and trading strategies.” Id. at 45.
166The built-in pauses in automated trading systems are designed to facilitate human judg-
ment when it appears the data on which the automated trades are being executed is
questionable or perhaps that a cataclysmic event, as-yet undiscovered by the firm operating
the platform, has occurred. See id. at 4–5, 35–38.
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managers and traders analyzed these unexpected events, they decided to
pull back liquidity.167 Many market makers, which execute trades for
clients internally rather than on exchanges, elected to send client orders to
public exchanges rather than take long positions (even for a brief period of
time) in a rapidly declining market.168 Because the general market senti-
ment was broadly negative that day,169 this withdrawal of liquidity led to
concentrated downward price pressure. This in turn triggered additional
built-in pauses to the extent the events in the equity futures indexes had
not already done so, causing a positive feedback effect that pushed prices
further downward.170 The “flash crash” illustrates how endogenous events
and market structure can destabilize financial markets in unpredictable
ways. The homogenous programming of the built-in pause feature
resulted in tight coupling and the disappearance of slack that could oth-
erwise allow negative feedback to “correct” prices. If the mutual fund’s
large sell order was not executed by reference to trading volumes, or if the
trading platforms’ risk management systems were not roughly homog-
enously programmed to withdraw liquidity upon the occurrence of non-
modeled events, or if the HFTs did not augment trading volume and allow
the execution of the large sell order over twenty minutes rather than
twenty hours, the market would not have experienced a nearly $1 trillion
loss in capitalization. But the flipside is also true: there are many near-miss
normal accidents that are still waiting to emerge from financial markets in
unpredictable ways.
c. Network effects of regulation and trading strategies. Regulation, too,
interacts dynamically with market actors and their transactions. In
particular, capital adequacy regulation renders firms susceptible to
positive feedback effects, termed “cyclicality” to connote an acceleration of
the normal credit cycle. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
which has been since 1988 the de facto capital adequacy regulator for
large banks, is straightforward about this: “[I]t is not possible
167Id. at 35 (“In general we found that many (though not all) firms we interviewed signifi-
cantly curtailed or completely halted their trading activities at some point during the after-
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to achieve greater risk sensitivity across institutions at a given point in time
without introducing a certain degree of cyclicality in minimum capital
requirements over time.”171 Capital requirements can inadvertently cause
a downward spiral in prices as initial signs of price weakness in asset A, if
large enough, can trigger increases in capital requirements. As capital
requirements increase banks might be forced to sell asset B to maintain
their capitalization levels, which could put pressure on other banks
holding asset B, and so forth.172 Similar effects have been observed in
connection with trading strategies and standardized contracts; where
banks are utilizing the same strategies or contracts, seemingly insignificant
events can cause the emergence of massive and unpredictable price move-
ments.173 In such circumstances, distinct components of banks’ networked
operating environment—for example, the capital adequacy regime and
price levels—can become tightly coupled. These procyclical phenomena
have been referred to as “financial accelerators”174 and are obviously
more pronounced when firms are operating in a highly leveraged
environment.175
171BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20, at 5.
172See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 341–56
(2011).
173Such correlated trading strategies caused the 1987 stock market crash and the May 2010
“flash crash.” The culprit in the former was so-called “portfolio insurance” that had prolif-
erated rapidly through the market in the 1980s. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS:
THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 314–20 (1996). A contributory cause to the latter was a
widespread tendency for high-frequency traders to use automated high-volume algorithmic
trading strategies without taking large short or long positions in the traded securities, which
resulted in spiked trading volumes that interacted in unpredictable ways with a large single
order. See supra notes 162–70 and accompanying text.
174SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 29 (2010).
175The Basel Committee’s Basel III Framework imposes a countercyclical capital buffer to
guard against the operation of the financial accelerator. See BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note
20, at 57–60. The countercyclical buffer is inspired by the “dynamic provisioning” technique
employed by Spanish bank regulators. It requires each jurisdiction to authorize an agency to
implement an additional countercyclical capital buffer where the agency has adjudged that
“excess credit growth” has occurred. Because it will require a regulator to make a prudential
evaluation of the total volume of credit in the economy, it can be categorized as a “macro-
prudential” regulatory tool. See id. For a skeptical analysis on the promise of macroprudential
regulation, see Dan Awrey, Macro-Prudential Financial Regulation: Panacea or Placebo?, 1
AMSTERDAM L.F., no. 3, 2009 at 17.
690 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
2. Experimental Demonstrations of Financial Complexity and
Network Effects
Advances in computer technology have enabled scientists and economists
to conduct experiments involving millions of network interactions among
thousands of adaptive hypothetical agents in a financial market. These
“agent-based models” utilize an inductive approach under which the
experiment designers make assumptions about how prices are formed and
how agents make decisions.176 The computer then simulates real-world
interactions among the agents as they make decisions. These network
simulations hold advantages over empirical tests that use actual or esti-
mated data to simulate the contagion effects of a shock—sometimes called
“counterfactual simulations”—because researchers conducting such tests
are unable to discern which data to change, and in what increments, to test
for contagion effects.177 The empirical studies therefore suffer from a
“black box” problem. The computer-based experiments, by contrast, are
deterministic because the programs and the parameters are fixed. Out-
comes are highly sensitive to initial starting conditions. While these con-
ditions may be modeled ex ante, no marriage of economics, computer
science, and physics is anywhere close to being able to create a complete
model of real financial markets,178 so the results of these studies are not
176J. Doyne Farmer, Toward Agent-Based Models for Investment, 2001 AIMR CONF. PROC.: DEV.
QUANTITATIVE INVESTMENT MODELS 61, 61–64, available at http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~jdf/
papers/aimr.pdf.
177See Christian Upper, Using Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Danger of Contagion in
Interbank Markets 14 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 234, 2007), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/work234.pdf.
178The chief complicating factor is that the key decision-making actors in the economy are
human beings, who have heterogeneous and shifting beliefs about the future and are even
prone to irrational processing of information. See Aikman et al., supra note 77, at 6–9; cf.
Arthur, supra note 74, at 107 (“[U]nlike ions in a spin glass, which always react in a simple way
to their local magnetic field, economic elements (human agents) react with strategy and
foresight by considering outcomes that might result as a consequence of behavior they might
undertake.”); Farmer et al., supra note 76, at 39 (“The most fundamental difference between
a physical system and an economy is that an economy is inhabited by people, who have
strategic interactions. Because people think and plan, and then make decisions based on their
plans, they are much more complicated than atoms.”). Thus, actual risk interacts with
perceptions of risk to affect future actual risk. George Soros has used the term “reflexivity” to
refer to this dynamic process in financial markets. See GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY OF FINANCE:
READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET 27–45 (2d ed. 1994). Stated another way, “Outcomes are
endogenous to beliefs about the likelihoods of the outcomes.” Aikman et al., supra note 77, at
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predictive of real market behavior. However, they have tremendous utility
in unveiling emergent network properties and isolating the sensitivity of
financial networks to changes in certain parameters. Moreover, in contrast
to the counterfactual simulations that look at empirical data, experimental
research can individuate how the parameters cause the emergent proper-
ties with greater precision.
Two sets of experiments merit mention here because they establish the
nonlinear dynamics of even simplified, computer-modeled financial mar-
kets. In the first set of experiments summarized here, researchers explore
how a complex, interactive financial market could become subject to non-
linear phase transitions (sometimes referred to as “shocks”) based only on
the internal structure of the market. The second set of experiments look at
financial network topology by modeling how positive feedback can cause an
initial shock at a single institution to propagate through a financial system.
a. How shocks arise endogenously from market structure. In one study, a
group of physicists, computer scientists, and economists affiliated with the
Santa Fe Institute ran an experiment to see what a market would look
like when a group of hypothetical heterogeneous investor–agents drew
from a preformulated bank of trading strategies, observed their results,
and adapted them in light of their experience—all on a continuous,
rolling basis.179 Because of the dynamic interaction between the investor-
agents, and the fact that the investor–agents’ adaptive selections of
trading strategies depended in large part on which trading strategies they
anticipated their trading partners would adopt, prices were driven
endogenously by the expectations of the investor–agents.180 Thus, the
authors describe, “[I]ndividual beliefs or expectations become endog-
enous to the market, and constantly compete within an ecology of
others’ beliefs or expectations.”181 In this ecology of expectations where,
most importantly, price is set by demand for assets among a group of
7. While it is true that “the odds on a 100-year storm do not change because people think that
such a storm has become more likely,” the odds of a bank run are very much affected by
subjective human perceptions of its likelihood. JOHN KAMBHU ET AL., NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMIC RISK: A REPORT ON A CONFERENCE COSPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK AND THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 48 (2007).
179See Arthur et al., supra note 87, at 15.
180Id. at 38.
181Id. at 15.
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heterogeneous investor-agents, deductive reasoning is unhelpful because
investor–agents are unable to know what their trading partners are think-
ing.182 The authors note that the expansive use of heuristic, inductive
rules-of-thumb can create positive feedback:
Under heterogeneity, however, not only is there no objective means by which
others’ dividend expectations can be known, but attempts to eliminate the
other unknowns, the price expectations, merely lead to the repeated iteration
of subjective expectations of subjective expectations (or, equivalently, subjec-
tive priors on others’ subjective priors)—an infinite regress in subjectivity.
Further, this regress may lead to instability: If investor i believes that others
believe future prices will increase, he may revise his expectations to expect
upward-moving prices. If he believes that others believe a reversion to lower
values is likely, he may revise his expectations to expect a reversion. We can,
therefore, easily imagine swings and swift transitions in investors’ beliefs,
based on little more than ephemera—hints and perceived hints of others’
beliefs about others’ beliefs.183
The results of the study demonstrated that whether the system
settled on equilibrium depended on the frequency with which the
investor–agents were allowed to adopt new trading strategies.184 Under the
first scenario, investor–agents traded less frequently and an equilibrium
emerged whereby prices tended to correspond with fundamental value.
On the other hand, under a higher, more realistic trading frequency, the
results changed dramatically. The authors found instead systematic evi-
dence of instability in the form of bubbles and crashes, driven by trading
volumes that were three times larger than those obtained in the first
scenario as investor–agents searched desperately for successful trading
strategies. Thus, by adjusting the trading frequency alone, the system
underwent a phase transition to a system characterized by punctuated
equilibrium with intermittent chaotic episodes.185 The authors determined




184See id. at 38.
185The authors refer to the punctuated equilibrium phenomenon as “volatility clustering.” Id.
at 35 n.14.
186Id. at 31 (“We note that fat tails and high volume are also characteristic of price data from
actual financial markets.”).
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Though the authors did not expressly address network effects, it is
obvious that an increase in the trading frequency would expand the
interrelatedness of the market network’s nodes. Network effects theory
would predict the increase in volatility and instability that the authors
observed. The authors impliedly tied their results to network theory:
Once in a while, randomly, more successful expectations will be discovered.
Such expectations will change the market, and trigger further changes in
expectations, so that small and large “avalanches” of change will cascade
through the system . . . . Changes then manifest in the form of increased
volatility and increased volume . . . . The larger [the trading frequency] is, the
faster individual agents “switch” among their predictors. Thus the more such
switches should cascade.187
In a study a few years later, Santa Fe Institute physicist Doyne Farmer
ran a series of experiments that demonstrated that bubbles could arise in
asset markets even when the investor–agents knew what the fundamental values of
the assets were. Farmer posited a single-asset market that consisted of: (1) a
single value investor, who assesses a security’s value and buys it if it is
underpriced; and (2) a single market maker, who takes both the buy and
sell side of a transaction, pocketing the spread as a profit.188 His value
investor knew the fundamental values of securities, so under general
equilibrium conditions the price would immediately converge with the
value. But Farmer found that whether prices tracked fundamental values
depended on the risk aversion of the market maker.189 If the market maker
was risk-averse and executed transactions at a slow rate to avoid taking on
large net positions, the price effects of changes in fundamental value did
not occur instantaneously but rather showed what physicists refer to as a
“temporal structure.”190 This temporal structure of price effects in turn
created trends in prices, but the system behaved linearly and nonchaoti-
cally. Importantly, the temporal structure did not arise from noise trading
because Farmer’s hypothetical market provided for a single value investor
with perfect information. Instead, the price-value mismatch arose entirely
from the dynamic interaction of the market’s agents.191
187Id. at 33–35.
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Farmer then introduced new agents into his market ecosystem: a
“seasonal trader” who bought and sold according to factors external to the
asset market—for example, a farming concern that needed to sell its
crop—and a technical investor who tried to spot price trends and take
advantage of the seasonal trader.192 The technical investor—like the
investor–agents from the earlier Santa Fe trading-strategies experiment—
selected from a bank of trading heuristic rules and adapted its behavior in
light of experience.193 When Farmer simulated the market interactions
among the market maker, the value investor, the seasonal trader, and the
technical investor, he found that price gradually settles, at an increasing
rate, to fundamental value as time advanced from t = 0 to t = 5000.194 This
result obtains because the technical investors learn how to time the market
to exploit the seasonal traders.195 However, after t = 5000, the technical
investors, who by that point possess nearly all the wealth, begin exerting
the largest influence on the market. The heuristics that the technical
investors had used to bring the market to a near-equilibrium are now
inappropriate in the context of a new market structure where seasonal
traders no longer contribute significantly to price formation. The results
are dramatic, chaotic oscillations in price driven by complex interactions
among the agents.196 And the apparent chaos is not short-lived: “The
statistical properties of prices continue to change, even tens of thousands
of iterations later, as the feeding relationships of who is exploiting whom
shift around.”197 These experiments evidence the nonlinear dynamics of
even simple, stylized markets for financial assets with limited numbers of
agents of limited irrationality.
In another more recent experiment, a team of Italian “econo-
physicists” modeled how a stylized derivatives market would behave as the
192See id. at 68.
193See id.
194Id. at 69 & fig.5. Farmer measured time at discrete moments at t, t+1, and so forth, in order
to be able to synchronize trades. See id. at 66. Among other things, this enabled Farmer to
register price patterns as the market maker unloaded its position a bit at a time, depending
on its risk aversion. Id. at 67. The important point here is that t measures the time series along
which transactions occur rather than any calendar time space.
195See id. at 69.
196Id. at 70.
197Id.
2012 / Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture 695
number of derivative financial instruments increased.198 Their results were
consistent with the “complexity catastrophe” and “conflicting constraints”
threats that Kauffman warns about in the context of biological evolution.199
The authors found that while increasing the number of tradable financial
instruments at first enhanced the market’s efficiency—because traders
were able to arbitrage away any pricing inefficiencies with the increasingly
differentiated mix of instruments—a nonlinear phase transition arose
when the number of financial instruments reached a critical level.200 An
increase in the number of tradable financial instruments amounted to an
increase in the market’s complexity, as traders could take on positions and
hedge them or arbitrage away inefficiencies by taking on positions in other
financial instruments.201 The complex interactions between the increasing
numbers of financial instruments caused a phase transition that knocked
the market out of equilibrium. Networked systems that exhibit initially
increased abilities to absorb shocks, but are vulnerable to sudden phase
transitions, have been described as “robust-yet-fragile.”202 This “double-
edged sword” trait of interconnectedness recalls the previous discussion of
how the productive advantages of network connectivity can quickly bump
up against conflicting constraints.203
Figure 3 below illustrates the jarring emergence of sharp swings in
demand.204 The vertical axis (S) represents the demand for the financial
instruments and the horizontal axis (n) represents the number of tradable
financial instruments in the market. The lines represent different risk
premia (e) that the financial intermediaries executing the trades require
from the parties requesting the trades.205
198See Caccioli et al., supra note 97.
199See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
200See Caccioli et al., supra note 97, at 468.
201Id. at 469.
202E.g., Gai & Kapadia, supra note 150, at 2401; Haldane, supra note 154, at 9.
203See supra Part II.C.2.
204Caccioli et al., supra note 97, at 472 fig.2 (reprinted with the kind permission of the
European Physical Journal B).
205In the portion of the paper discussed here, the authors assume that the risk premia are
identical for all financial instruments for any given scenario. See id. at 470–71.
696 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
The two most interesting implications of Figure 3 for present pur-
poses are (1) the razor-tight sensitivity of demand to the banks’ risk premia
and (2) the dramatic and unexpected shift in demand when n reaches
approximately 4.1 financial instruments. In a later paper, Andrew
Haldane of the Bank of England and physicist Robert May interpreted the
experiment’s results as evidence that
once there are enough derivatives to span the space of available states of
nature (the net supply of derivatives within the system necessary to meet true
hedging demand from non-banks), the market is essentially complete in the
[traditional general equilibrium] sense . . . . Once that happens, gross deriva-
tives positions within the system are essentially unbounded. So long as there is
an incentive to supply new instruments—a positive premium to trading—
banks will continue to expand gross positions, independent of true hedging
demand from non-banks. Such trades are essentially redundant, increasing
the dimensionality and complexity of the network at a cost in terms of stability,
with no welfare gain because market completeness has already been
achieved.206
206Haldane & May, supra note 157, at 352 (footnote omitted).
Figure 3. Interactions between Demand and Number of Tradable
Financial Instruments.
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b. How financial networks cause initial shocks to spread contagion. As
provocative as these experimental results are, they illustrate how an unpre-
dictable initial shock to financial markets would arise from the dynamic
interaction of agents in a network. This is only half of the problem. As
previously discussed, a network’s susceptibility to contagion by means
of a positive feedback catastrophe depends on its topology—that is, the
number, interconnectedness, and bias of its nodes—and can be exacerbated
by the presence of tight coupling.207 Recent studies have begun to take up
the question of network topology by modeling how shocks at the institu-
tional level propagate through financial systems through both the asset and
liability side of bank balance sheets.208 These studies model a network by
making assumptions about the key parameters that define its topology and
then run computer simulations to test how the network reacts to changes.
One study investigated the contagion effects on the banking system of
an idiosyncratic—in other words, not system-wide—shock to a single
bank’s external assets. The study modeled the following network topology
parameters: (1) the interconnectedness of the banks, each of which com-
prised a node of the network; (2) the percentage of the banks’ assets
comprised of interbank, as opposed to out-of-network, claims; (3) the
concentration of the banking market; (4) the banks’ net worth; and (5)
the effects of illiquidity upon the resolution of an insolvent bank.209 The
authors of the study ran thousands of computer simulations, varying the
parameters slightly to individuate their effects. Some of their findings were
expected; for example, they found that a banking system is more suscep-
tible to contagion when banks have impaired capital positions and when
the banking industry is highly concentrated—in other words, when the
network has fewer nodes.210
But other findings are more intriguing from a regulatory perspec-
tive. For instance, the authors discovered that a bank’s vulnerability to
contagion from another bank’s default increased as its percentage of
interbank—in other words, in-network—liabilities increased.211 Moreover,
207See supra Part II.C.
208See Gai & Kapadia, supra note 150; Nier et al., supra note 136.
209Nier et al., supra note 136, at 2035, 2042–47.
210See id. at 2042–43, 2046–47, 2053–54.
211See id. at 2043–44, 2054.
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interesting nonlinear results presented for the network connectivity
parameter. At first, an increase in the interbank connectivity increases the
risk of contagion, but once the network is highly connected, further
increases in connectivity make the system more resilient because the shock
is absorbed by a greater number of banks.212 This latter phenomenon is
only present where the banking system is well-capitalized; in a poorly
capitalized banking system, greater connectivity will result in quicker
transmission of contagion through the system.213 In other words, the banks
become tightly coupled to one another. Not surprisingly, the authors
found that liquidity pressures resulting from fire-sale dispositions of failing
banks’ assets increased the banking system’s vulnerability, especially if the
system is highly concentrated.214
Other recent studies examine how network topology affects conta-
gion on the liability side of the balance sheet through so-called “liquidity
hoarding.”215 During the credit freeze of 2007–2008 and through much of
2009, banks doubted the solvency of their counterparties and refused to
lend capital in the interbank markets, instead opting to hold excess
reserves with central banks and forgo the spread they could have earned
by lending.216 Prasanna Gai, Andrew Haldane, and Sujit Kapadia found
that network properties of the unsecured interbank loan market can cause
positive feedback loops that result in banks dramatically retrenching from
the interbank market. The findings suggest that “tipping points may be
embedded in the financial network . . . [that] depend on the level of liquid
asset holdings, the amount of interbank activity, and the size of haircuts on
banks’ assets.”217 In particular, the authors illustrate the dynamic interac-
tion between the unsecured interbank lending market and the secured
“repo” lending market. A repo transaction entails borrowing money using
212Id. at 2044–46, 2054.
213Id.
214See id. at 2047–51, 2054. Liquidity shortages result in reduced “slack” in the financial
system and tighter coupling among markets and individual transactions, as demonstrated
amply by the May 2010 “flash crash.” See supra notes 162–70 and accompanying text.
215E.g., Gai et al., supra note 137, at 454.
216See Florian Heider et al., Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of
Counterparty Risk 7–8 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1126, 2009), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1126.pdf.
217Gai et al., supra note 137, at 454.
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securities as collateral. It is structured as the spot sale of securities for cash,
coupled with an agreement to repurchase the same securities at the initial
price plus interest at a particular date in the future. When the borrowed
cash is lower in amount than the current market value of the securities
used as collateral, the discount is referred to as a “haircut.”218 In a repo
transaction, the lenders bear the market risk associated with the lent
securities, and they impose haircuts to compensate for the risk that the
borrower defaults and the collateral declines in value. When counterpar-
ties demand deeper haircuts, borrowers naturally have less cash. The
Gai-Haldane-Kapadia model assumes that a bank will hoard liquidity—
that is, it will withdraw or refuse to roll over existing interbank lending—
when it faces a liquidity shortage brought on by increased haircuts.219
Their model produces some illuminating results from a networks
perspective. In their baseline scenario, the authors assumed the interbank
network had a so-called Poisson structure, meaning that the links between
banks are distributed roughly uniformly rather than in a concentrated
manner.220 They assumed further that a single bank received a liquidity
shock in the form of an increased haircut for its repo borrowings. They
tested the model for various levels of average interconnectedness of the
interbank lending network, which they denote by the parameter z, ranging
from z = 0 (no connectivity) to z = 100 (each node is connected to all other
nodes). The z parameter can be considered a rough proxy for the com-
plexity of the funding aspect of the financial system—that is, the liabilities
side of banks’ balance sheets.221 In this baseline scenario, there was a low
frequency of contagion at very low levels of interconnectedness, a high
frequency of contagion for moderate levels of interconnectedness
(3 < z < 12), and a low frequency of contagion when 12 < z < 15, which
became zero around z = 15.222 The researchers identify z = 7.5 as the
218Id. at 454 n.2.
219Id. at 454.
220Id.
221This relation obtains because interbank funding represents a large portion of a bank’s
funding base. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
222Gai et al., supra note 137, at 462 fig.6. The probability of contagion is nonmonotonic,
meaning that it first rapidly increases, only to later decrease with still further interconnect-
edness. Id. at 462. When z = 0, the probability of contagion must also be zero because there
is no channel through which contagion may occur. Contagion “remains positive for higher
700 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
tipping point at which further increases in interconnectedness will increase
the system’s resilience to contagion.223 The authors found that for nearly
all values of z, when contagion did spread throughout the network, it was
complete and nonlocalized.224 For higher levels of interconnectedness,
there was no contagion because the shock was absorbed across a wider
array of banks on account of the greater interconnections. The authors
then tested how the network would react to the same singular shock but
this time in combination with an across-the-board increase of the aggre-
gate haircuts required by all repo lenders from 0.1 to 0.2.225 Not surpris-
ingly, the haircut increase lowered the resilience of the network to
contagion because banks had less of a cushion with which to absorb a
liquidity shock. Here, the system underwent contagion spillovers with a
high frequency when 3 < z < 25, and contagion occurred with a lower
frequency for all values of z higher than 30.226 The tipping point increased
from z = 7.5 to around z = 15, meaning that the haircut, by draining
liquidity from the interbank network, resulted in contagion occurring
for a wider range of interconnectedness.227 The direct relationship
between thin capitalization and susceptibility to contagion recalls the
earlier discussion of tight coupling: the thinner a bank’s capitalization,
the more tightly its financial well-being is coupled to that of its
counterparties.228
In the next set of experiments, the authors changed the structure of
the network from a Poisson structure to a so-called geometric structure, in
which a certain number of banks are more interconnected than others.
[than 7.5] values of z . . . due to the randomness of the network structure which means that
contagion can still break out under certain configurations.” Id. Moreover, “the reason con-
tagion is not always certain for smaller values of z is that the initial shock may hit a bank which
either has no interbank assets, and is therefore unable to trigger any contagion by hoarding




226Id. fig.6. As with the baseline scenario, the probability of contagion is nonmonotonic in
connectivity. See supra note 222.
227Gai et al., supra note 137, at 462.
228See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
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The authors correctly point out that this simulation, with its assumption of
a few densely connected banks, approximates real-world financial mar-
kets,229 which have undergone dramatic increases in concentration levels
over the past three decades.230 In this scenario, the isolated singular shock
never results in the high likelihood of contagion observed with respect to
the Poisson network.231 However, frequencies are moderately high for a
wider range of interconnectedness. And frequencies of contagion do not
converge at zero until z equals almost seventy—in sharp contrast to the
singular shock to the Poisson network, where contagion virtually disap-
pears by the time z = 15.232 When the percentage of a bank’s liabilities that
are comprised of interbank transactions increases from fifteen percent—as
the authors assumed in their baseline scenario—to twenty-five percent, the
frequencies of contagion are amplified. They are quite high even at low
levels of interconnectedness and persist over a still wider range of
interconnectedness—until z equals almost 80.233 Thus, “for a broad range
of connectivity, higher concentration in the network makes the system
more susceptible to a systemic liquidity crisis.”234
When an isolated shock at a single bank occurs in the concentrated
geometric network, the results depend on whether the singular shock hits
a periphery bank or a highly connected bank at the center of the network.
If the targeted bank is a highly connected bank, contagion occurs more
frequently than in the targeted Poisson network simulations, and it is a
near certainty for a vast range of z.235 These results are troubling but not
altogether surprising. The authors note that the results demonstrate that
the most dangerous banks from the standpoint of network stability are
229Gai et al., supra note 137, at 463.
230See id. at 456 fig.2; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 67
(2010), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf (describing the
interbank lending market as a network configuration in which “a few large banks that are
highly interconnected, and a larger number of smaller banks that are connected to the rest
of the network (mostly) through one of the larger banks”).
231See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
232See Gai et al., supra note 137, at 463 fig.7.
233Id. at 463 fig.7, 464.
234Id. at 464.
235See id. at 462 fig.6, 463 fig.7, 464.
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those that are especially prone to an initial shock and those that propagate
the shock widely.236 At present, the same large, complex banks fit both of
these descriptions—the former on account of their heavy involvement in
repo activity and the latter on account of their high degree of connected-
ness with the interbank network.237 As a result, the financial system is
susceptible both to frequent shocks and to fast transmission of those shocks
through the network.
These financial network topology studies are noteworthy because
they demonstrate the existence of sharp nonlinear events in financial
market networks. They also uncover patterns between changes in the
interconnectedness and concentration of markets and market stability.
While fixing the ex ante parameters of the experiments permits those
conducting the studies to make probabilistic predictions of network behav-
ior, it is not possible in real life to identify and estimate accurately all
relevant parameters in order to divine the singular events that engender
threats to institutional safety and soundness and to market-wide financial
stability. In other words, if the experimental research shows unpredictable
tipping points and singularities when we are able to set up a deterministic
system, then it is immeasurably more difficult to predict system behavior
when the parameters are uncertain. How can regulators, in light of their
bounded rationality, identify and remediate threats to financial stability at
the systemic level and unsafe and unsound practices at the institutional
level? This is the crux of the problem for financial regulators. Increasing
complexity might result in bounded rationality transforming from an
obstacle to be overcome to a structural impediment to sensible regulatory
control.
3. Implications of Complexity for Financial Regulation
Financial regulators are not investment managers, and they are not in the
prediction business. But their statutory mandates are broad.238 Under
conditions of complexity, the task of monitoring the safety and soundness
236See id. at 464.
237See id.
238See supra Part II.B.
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of a financial institution, to say nothing of promoting the stability of an
entire financial system, requires at a minimum that the regulators famil-
iarize themselves with the topology and dynamics of the intrafirm
and market-wide networks through which nonlinear episodes of
contagion could spread. In these complex, highly networked environ-
ments, a core assumption of the New Deal administrative system—namely,
that agencies possess the requisite expertise to build a regulatory system
that promotes the administrative objectives—ceases to obtain. It is prob-
ably not a coincidence that the rapid acceleration in financial innovation
and complexity during the 1980s coincided with a heightened faith in
markets as ordering mechanisms and, by implication, a belief that the
administrative state had become obsolete. In a way, it was beginning to do
just that—just not in the way that the trumpeters of market efficiency
envisioned. Yet ideology only tells part of the story; in a very real way,
increased complexity, along with widening information asymmetries
between regulators and regulated firms, has removed regulators from
their privileged perch as “expert” superintendents as contemplated by the
New Deal theorists.239 Even commentators indisposed to purely market-
based, private ordering of events should recognize the challenge to the
viability of the administrative state.240
239See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
240It is hardly surprising therefore, given the state of the contemporary financial industry,
to read the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report recount the inability of bank regu-
lators, even with the help of industry competitors, to gauge a simple concept like the
balance sheet solvency of Lehman Brothers on the eve of its collapse. According to the
Report:
Solvency should be a simple financial concept: if your assets are worth more than your
liabilities, you are solvent; if not, you are in danger of bankruptcy. But on the afternoon
of Friday, September 12, 2008, experts from the country’s biggest commercial and
investment banks met at the Wall Street offices of the Federal Reserve to ponder the fate
of Lehman Brothers, and could not agree whether or not the 157-year-old firm was
solvent.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES 324 (2011). No doubt the Federal Reserve’s task was complicated by the over one
million derivatives positions that were outstanding on that date. See Serena Ng & Mike
Spector, The Specter of Lehman Shadows Trade Partners, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at C1
(documenting 1.2 million derivatives transactions outstanding with 6500 counterparties); see
also Aline van Duyn, Dodd-Frank Deadline Looms but Derivatives Are Still in Flux, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2011, at 15 (referring to “too much interconnection” in derivatives markets and noting
that a “key plank of financial market reform” is “[r]educing these connections”).
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III. STRUCTURAL REGULATION VERSUS
BEHAVIORAL REGULATION
Any assessment of a regulatory approach or toolkit must start with con-
sideration of “whether it offers assistance in addressing the challenges
regulators face in practice.”241 This Part takes up that question in the
context of financial regulation by analyzing the comparative effectiveness
of structural regulatory tools and behavioral regulatory tools under con-
ditions of complexity.242 By “structural tools” I refer to restrictions on firm
241Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MODERN L. REV. 59, 59
(2008); see also Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 LAW
& POL’Y 181, 183 (2010) (“[O]nce regulators have established their objectives, they should
consider how any given regulatory approach comes to grips with the . . . fundamental tasks
involved in implementing regulation so as to further those objectives.”).
242The structural–behavioral binary is not meant to describe all the dimensions along which
the problems of contemporary financial regulation could be considered. I have elsewhere
advocated for a focus on “meta-risk management” and “new governance” regulatory tech-
niques in financial regulation. See Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life
Insurance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to Principles-Based
Reserving, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 35, 90–99 (2011) [hereinafter Weber, Teleological Drift]; Robert
F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 836–67 (2010)
[hereinafter Weber, Internal Models]. Other helpful analytical distinctions abound in this
context, including, to mention only a few, “enforced self-regulation,” “management-based
regulation,” and “reliability”-focused regulation. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8,
at 19–27 (describing the “benign big gun” as a linchpin of an “enforced self-regulation”
regime, aiming to appeal to the social responsibility of actors to obtain voluntary compliance,
but also standing ready to deploy deterrent threat sanctions of increasing severity to motivate
purely economically motivated rational actors and incapacitate chronic law violators); Cary
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 691 (2003) (advocating for “management-based
regulation” as an alternative to “technology-based regulation” and “performance-based regu-
lation” that will be optimal when “regulated entities are heterogeneous and regulatory
outputs are relatively difficult to monitor”); William H. Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents
in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an Example 1–12 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 9180, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=columbia_pllt (promoting a “reliability” perspec-
tive to bank regulation to counter the “vulgar optimization” perspective that can “lead[] in
practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of
complex judgment and learning”). These general strategic regulatory orientations, which
incidentally are better categorized as behavioral regulation than as structural regulation,
share a focus on achieving objectives in conditions of uncertainty and volatility, and are
therefore motivated by the same challenges I undertake to address in this article. Given the
present structure of the financial system, however, the likelihood of implementing an effective
new governance or meta-risk management regime is low. See Weber, Teleological Drift, supra,
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size or the scope of activities in which firms are permitted to engage that
have the effect of removing the incentives for undesirable behavior.243 By
“behavioral tools” I refer instead to initiatives that acknowledge the incen-
tives for undesirable behavior and aim to counteract or mitigate their
effects.244 Both the structural and behavioral toolkit are broad; the former
includes both forced break-ups and restrictions on activities, and the latter
spans from highly detailed and prescriptive capital adequacy regulation245
to the imposition of open-ended common law fiduciary duties for courts to
administer.
A question lurks in the background of recent financial regulatory
reform debates: whether to adopt a behavioral regulatory regime that
reacts via incremental, ad hoc responses to a complex industrial logic
subject to significant uncertainty or instead to adopt a structural regula-
tory regime that shapes, by adjusting financial market network structures,
the industrial logic itself so as to minimize its vulnerability to perturba-
tion.246 Another way of conceptualizing this concededly rough binary is
at 98 (highlighting difficulties raised “[w]hen regulators are captured, either literally or
through the operation of more hegemonic forces”). Introducing more robust participation by
civil society in governance might blunt the tendency to capture, but would likely require
public funding and formal deputization of affected constituencies to participate in matters
that impact financial firms’ governance. See Saule Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guard-
ians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924546 (proposing creation
of a “Public Interest Council” to serve as a representative of the public interest in a “tripartite”
regulatory regime that ensures participation of public regulators, civil society, and regulated
industry); Weber, Internal Models, supra, at 863–65 (describing how robust participation by
constituencies affected by financial industry decisions is complicated by wide dispersion of
members of affected constituency, who cannot “marshal their resources as effectively as
regulated financial institutions to engage regulators in a debate”). The emphasis in this article
on the network topologies of finance and their resultant complex attributes accordingly
focuses on the ways in which these problems, which are by their very nature structural, can
be remediated through structural reform.
243See John Kay & John Vickers, Regulatory Reform in Britain, 3 ECON. POL’Y 285, 314 (1988)
(“The regulation of structure is designed to reduce or remove the opportunity for undesired
conduct rather than prohibit it from occurring.”).
244See supra Part I (describing the general purpose of financial regulation to counteract market
failures).
245See infra note 288 and accompanying text (discussing whether a prescriptive capital
adequacy regime might be so coercive that it would effect an intended structural change).
246See NAT’L PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT
WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 62 (1993) (describing “governance” as “setting priorities, then
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whether to create a regulatory system that structures optimal incentives
for economic actors, or one that seeks to control behavior arising from
suboptimal incentives through ever-increasingly complicated rules and
regulations.247
The structural regulatory approach would mean paring back com-
plexity. Structural reform through enforced simplicity poses a macroengi-
neering challenge: how to construct a resilient regime that structures the
right incentives from the outset. Economists refer to this as “mechanism
design.”248 In a networked environment, this means “act[ing] directly on
the topology of the network.”249 The goal of structural regulation is to
address market failure by deploying public power to set up a system that
largely can run on its own; the need for ongoing supervision is diminished
because the system has been structured so that secured regulatory objec-
tives occur organically through self-interested transacting parties. By con-
trast, proposals to regulate behavior within existing complex network
structures pose a microengineering problem of how to construct finely
tuned rules that foster regulatory objectives.
The structural approach is attractive because, recalling Haldane and
May, where markets are complete, additional market activity increases the
complexity of a system at a cost of stability with no welfare gain.250 In
adopting the structural approach, lawmakers could minimize the twin
threats of complexity capture and arbitrary regulation by altering market
structure so that bounded rationality no longer constitutes an impassable
using the federal government’s immense power to steer what happens in the private sector”);
Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance? Market Architectures, Normal
Accidents, and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS, PART A 281, 283 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds,
Emerald Books Research in the Sociology of Organizations Series vol. 30A, 2010) (“If we take
seriously the notion that regulation constitutes markets, rather than merely intervening in
markets ‘after the fact,’ then the current moment becomes an opportunity to rethink market
architecture, in light of the problems of complexity and tight coupling.”).
247See John Kay, The Nightmare of Taking on “Too Big to Fail,” FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at 9.
248See generally Eric S. Maskin, Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. 567 (2008) (discussing that part of mechanism design called implementation theory,
which, given a social goal, characterizes a mechanism that can be designed with predicted
outcomes that coincide with the desirable outcomes, according to that goal).
249Gai et al., supra note 137, at 469.
250See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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roadblock for regulators, who can then more easily supervise a less
complex market structure.
In recent years, however, legislators and financial regulators have
largely eschewed structural reforms of the financial industry that would
limit the size, scope, and complexity of financial firms.251 Instead, they
have focused their efforts on making incremental changes to existing
frameworks in order to manage the behavior of actors transacting in the
complex, unstable, and uncertain networks through which financial func-
tions are conducted. But because the effects of given behaviors in complex
systems are often unpredictable and subject to positive feedback effects,
regulators are incapable of implementing ex cathedra and ex ante a system
of behavioral regulation that achieves statutory objectives. As such, they
look to regulated firms themselves, which naturally have better access to
information about the risks such businesses face, to provide the relevant
information. In the process, however, they have created a regulatory
environment where complexity capture pervades.
A. Structural Regulation as “Resilient” Regulation
This article proposes that structural reform to the financial sector would
minimize the salience of the bounded rationality problems today’s regu-
lators face by helping to remediate complexity capture and its resulting
regulatory dysfunction. It does not advocate for a specific structural
reform proposal. Nevertheless, it bears mention that policy makers’ focus
on behavioral regulation is not inevitable; several serious structural
reforms were proposed in recent years. In this section I will briefly high-
light three of these proposals and describe the ways in which they are
appropriately thought of as an attempt to bolster the resilience of the
financial system. I will also discuss why the bounded rationality of regula-
tors presents less of a problem in the context of a resilient regulated
market.
251See Kay & Vickers, supra note 243, at 288 (distinguishing structural regulation from
conduct regulation on the grounds that the former is concerned with “the way in which a
market is organized”). Whether this course of action is best explained by a traditional capture
analysis, whereby legislators and regulators traded favorable legislation and regulatory inter-
pretations for campaign funding and political support, is outside the scope of this article,
though other scholars have weighed in on this question. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, The
Federal Reserve We Need: It’s the Fed We Once Had (Chapman Univ. L. Res. Paper No. 11–12,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788325.
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Each of the proposed structural reforms discussed below is designed to
pare back financial complexity and is motivated by the concept of resil-
ience.252 Scholars and policy makers have been focusing more on the
concept of resilience as an operational ideal for managing systems charac-
terized by dynamism and complexity. For example, telecommunications
scholar Barbara Cherry exhorts policy makers to “embrace the challenge of
developing greater regulatory resilience; that is, to create regulatory struc-
tures and policies that are more adaptive to the complexity and the
increasing pace of technological innovation and ensuing economic and
social changes.”253 Resilient systems are designed to deal better with uncer-
tainty, and as such they offer the promise of achieving concrete objectives in
complex, fast-moving environments. Examples of resilient system manage-
ment include (1) forest fire management, which introduces firebreaks to
control the spread of wildfire; (2) utility service management, where the
network grid has built-in latencies to avoid overload and contagion; (3)
infectious disease control, which requires quarantine and travel restriction
responses; and (4) avalanche prevention through “snow seeding,” wherein
small avalanches are induced to reduce the likelihood of a large, cata-
strophic event.254 Perrow’s discussion of tight coupling has implications for
resilient regulation too.255 Systems characterized by loosely coupled com-
ponents exhibit their own resilience because “there is a better chance that
expedient, spur-of-the-moment buffers and redundancies and substitu-
tions can be found, even thought they were not planned ahead of time.”256
By contrast, control of systems characterized by tightly coupled components
requires advance planning: “In tightly coupled systems, the buffers and
252The first sentence of the new Basel III Framework notes that the new accord is inspired by
resilience: “This document . . . presents the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global
capital and liquidity rules with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector.” BASEL
III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20, at 5 (footnote omitted).
253Cherry, supra note 67, at 6.
254See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The $100 Billion Question,
Comments at the Institute of Regulation & Risk 7 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://
www.bis.org/review/r100406d.pdf; Larry Elliot, Mervyn King Urges System of Economic “Fire
Breaks,” GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2010, 16:10 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/
22/mervyn-king-economic-policy (proposing that policy makers could impose a firebreak
between the payments system network and risky activities).
255See supra Part II.C.3.
256PERROW, supra note 93, at 95.
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redundancies and substitutions must be designed in; they must be thought
of in advance.”257 But when the system is also characterized by interactive
complexity, advance planning of normal accidents will prove impossible,
and resilience is only achievable through scaling back complexity.258
Systems engineers cite modularity and robustness as two principal ways
to bolster a system’s resilience. A modular system is one that is designed
such that a failure of one system component does not compromise the
integrity of the entire system.259 A robust system is engineered to avoid
extreme outcomes in volatile, unpredictable environments through delib-
erate structuring and simplification in the system’s design.260
The relevance to financial regulation is obvious. Each of the
examples of resilient system management and regulation discussed below
aims to promote a dynamic stability, even in changing and volatile condi-
tions.261 Importantly, resilient systems are better equipped to run them-
selves and require less supervision, regulation, and enforcement from
authorities. As such, the proposed structural reforms discussed below
would counteract the bounded rationality problem—as well as its atten-
dant complexity capture problem—by imposing simpler structures on
financial firms and channeling their activities through more reliable and
comprehensible forms. Under such circumstances, the ordering principle
should resemble the equilibrating “invisible hand” of the market rather
than the sharp nonlinear singularities observed in the experimental
markets.262
257Id. at 94.
258See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
259See May et al., supra note 73, at 894 (defining modularity as “the degree to which the nodes
of a system can be decoupled into relatively discrete components”); Henry E. Smith, Modu-
larity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006)
(“Modularity allows complexity to become manageable by . . . partially closing off some parts
of the system and allowing these encapsulated components to interconnect only in certain
ways.” (emphasis omitted)).
260See Aikman et al., supra note 77, at 5.
261See Erik Hollnagel, Resilience: The Challenge of the Unstable, in RESILIENCE ENGINEERING:
CONCEPTS AND PRECEPTS 9, 16 (Erik Hollnagel et al. eds., 2006) (“The essence of resilience is
therefore the intrinsic ability of an organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically
stable state, which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the
presence of a continuous stress.”).
262Compare supra note 85 and accompanying text, with supra Part II.D.2.
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Most structural reform proposals would introduce some degree of
separation between less risky activities like the savings aggregation and
payments-system functions of banking and riskier activities like derivatives
trading. As such, these utility-like functions of banking would be easier to
supervise while the riskier activities would be subject to market discipline
on the premise that they would not be supported by safety nets. These
proposed reforms would (1) simplify and protect the business units—be
they legal entities or markets—that raise regulatory concerns and (2) foster
a market-based supervisory mechanism for business units outside the
protective regulatory fence, by making clear that those activities would not
have access to public safety net subsidies such as deposit insurance and
lender-of-last-resort privileges.
As an example, consider John Kay’s proposal for a “narrow banking”
industry, which would require all deposit-taking institutions to back their
accounts with secure assets and impose strict limits on permissible bank
activities.263 Larry Kotlikoff advances a similar “limited purpose banking”
proposal that would permit deposit-taking banks only to operate as pass-
through mutual fund companies, thus returning to their traditional role of
financial intermediaries—the middlemen who transform household
savings into investment capital.264 Simon Johnson and James Kwak offer a
more modest structural solution of breaking up the largest banks so that
none is of such size and interconnectedness that its failure would pose
contagion risks.265
The U.K.’s Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), led by
former chief economist of the Bank of England Sir John Vickers, has
advanced a “retail ring-fence” proposal that would see commercial
banking units separately capitalized as well as operationally and legally
independent from affiliates incurring higher levels of risk.266 This
263See John Kay, Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation (Sept. 15, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/
JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf.
264See LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD’s ONGOING FINANCIAL
PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING 123–88 (2010).
265See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 174, at 189–222.
266INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 35–36, 233–37 (2011) [herein-
after ICB FINAL REPORT], available at http://bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/ICB-Final-Report.pdf.
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proposal, which is self-consciously presented as a structural reform,267 aims
to prevent leakage of government subsidies from commercial banking—
which serves important policy objectives such as savings aggregation and
the reliability of the payments system—to the riskier activities.268 The ICB
had, in its earlier Interim Report, proposed a complete separation of
commercial banking from wholesale and investment banking. As such the
ICB Final Report is a more tentative step towards a structural solution.269
In fact, from the perspective of U.S. bankers, the ICB Final Report might
appear less radical than it appears to British bankers. The U.S. banking
system already has in place, after all, significant restrictions on transactions
between banks and their affiliates,270 and U.S. banks must already meet
capital requirements on a standalone basis.271 But the ICB Final Report is
noteworthy because it seeks to transform the highly integrated U.K. model
of commercial and investment banking into a more modular structure by
erecting a wall of separation between the two businesses that is in fact even
higher than the wall currently in force in the United States. It proposes to
accomplish this not only by requiring separate capitalization and restrict-
ing asset flows out of a bank to its affiliates but also through outright bans
on (1) trading derivatives or any other asset class and (2) incurring any
exposure to a non-ring-fenced bank.272
267See id. at 9–11.
268Id. at 69, 74, 131 (describing how the Report’s proposals are designed to curb subsidy
leakage); id. at 20 (highlighting the maintenance of credit flows and the payments system as
the Report’s “aims”).
269INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS 89–90 (2011)
[hereinafter INTERIM ICB REPORT], available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htcdn/
Interim-Report-110411.pdf.
270Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act sets forth interaffiliate restrictions and exposure
limits, and section 23B imposes an arms-length requirement on interaffiliate transactions, as
well as restrictions on purchases of securities by banks from affiliates and a prohibition on banks
indicating they are responsible for obligations of affiliates. See KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., 3–78
BANKING LAW § 78.12 (2011). Sections 23A and 23B apply equally to FDIC-insured banks and
thrifts that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (2006).
271See infra notes 299–303 and accompanying text.
272See ICB FINAL REPORT, supra note 266, at 51–52. The U.S. Congress included a similar
provision, known as the “swap push-out rule,” in the Dodd-Frank Act at the behest of U.S.
Senator Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376; Peter Eavis,ABank Overhaul
TooWeak to Hail, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at B14; Kevin Wack,House Panel Votes to Protect Bank
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As for post-crisis regulatory reforms in the United States, the so-called
Volcker Rule, included in a watered-down form in the Dodd-Frank Act, is
an overture to a structural reform approach.273 It prohibits affiliates of large
Data, AM. BANKER, Feb. 17, 2012, at 17. Senator Lincoln’s initial proposal would have prevented
any affiliate of a bank from dealing in derivatives. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 89–90 (2011). The
final rule was pared back to apply only to FDIC-insured banks—and more troublingly, the final
version includes wide-ranging carve-outs for significant derivatives business lines. See Swaps
Pushout Provisions, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (July 23, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/
webcasts/swaps-pushout-provisions-departments/ (beginning at 2:19).
273The Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule is designed to prevent bank holding companies
(including the large securities firms) and their affiliates from conducting proprietary trading
and taking equity positions in private equity and hedge funds. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act § 619. The statutory Volcker Rule requires the applicable federal
financial regulators—in this case the OCC, FRB, SEC, FDIC, and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)—to adopt implementing rules to carry it out. See id. (introducing
section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). The FDIC, FRB, OCC, and
SEC published proposed rules and requests for comment on November 7, 2011. See Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships
With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,864 (Nov. 7, 2011) (FDIC, FRB,
OCC, SEC). On February 14, 2012, the CFTC (the only remaining regulator holdout)
published a proposed set of rules and requests for comment in substantial conformity with the
other agencies’ proposed rules. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg.
8332 (Feb. 14, 2012) (CFTC). As of the time of this article’s publication, the agencies were
considering comments and preparing the final rules to implement the Volcker Rule. Irrespec-
tive of when the final rules are promulgated, the FRB has clarified that firms covered by the
Volcker Rule will have until July 21, 2014 to bring themselves into conformity with the new
rules. See Statement of Policy Regarding the Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in
Prohibited Proprietary Trading or Private Equity Fund or Hedge Fund Activities, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120419a1.pdf. As presently
proposed, the extent to which the rule will achieve its initial structural reform objective to limit
high-risk trading activity on the part of the corporate group enjoying a government safety net
will depend on federal banking regulators being able to distinguish between permitted
“market making” and prohibited “proprietary trading.” See Scott Patterson,Regulators Go to Bat
for the “Volcker Rule,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012 at C3. Financial institutions have been all too
eager to help the regulators with this interpretive task. From July 2010 to October 2011,
financial institutions met with federal regulators to discuss this and other issues related to the
Volcker Rule 351 times, compared to only 19 times for public interest groups. Annie Lowrey,
Facing Down the Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at B1. There is no reason to expect that the
industry participation ratio is any different during the current ongoing comment period. In
light of the difficulty of the task and the unbalanced participation in the rulemaking process,
I am inclined to share David Skeel’s skepticism on the likelihood that regulators are able to
agree on a rule that amounts to structural reform. See SKEEL, supra note 272, at 88 (predicting
that “[c]reative interpretation of proprietary and nonproprietary trading will permit a great
deal of banks’ current trading to continue”).
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bank holding companies and other systemically significant firms274 from
engaging in “proprietary trading” or sponsoring or owning interests in
private equity funds and hedge funds.275
The Kay, Kotlikoff, and ICB approaches are inspired by the concept
of robustness.276 Each would promote a more robust financial infrastruc-
ture through restructuring the financial network. Each would to some
extent hive off the core banking activities from the riskier network nodes
discussed above. In particular, they offer the promise of protecting both
the core savings-aggregation function of deposit taking and the payments
system by minimizing subsidy leakage from the public safety net to many
of its riskier nodes and links. The public safety net, consisting of deposit
insurance and access to the discount window for deposit-taking institu-
tions, exists to support these traditional banking business lines. By insu-
lating them from riskier business lines—and the contagion threats they
pose—policy makers can avoid extreme outcomes, a hallmark of robust
systems. The effects of these activity restrictions are analogous to stripping
a poker deck of wildcards or snow seeding to prevent avalanches.277
Modularity inspires the Johnson-Kwak and ICB proposals. Thus, in
a modular financial system any insolvent bank, no matter its size and
complexity, could be resolved—even in a complex, drawn-out process—
without posing contagion effects to the rest of the network. Part II.D.2.b
explained how a geometric market structure comprised of a few large,
nerve-center banks that are highly interconnected to the rest of the finan-
cial system can result in greater frequencies of contagion spillovers.278 The
Johnson-Kwak proposal to impose meaningful size restrictions on financial
firms shows how smallness promotes not only the competition objectives of
274The newly created FSOC will designate these nonbank, systemically significant firms. See
supra notes 51, 63 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and responsibilities of the
FSOC).
275See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619.
276Kay makes this point expressly. See Kay, supra note 263, at 16–17. They are also inspired by
the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), a Depression-era law that mandated separation of commercial
banking from the securities and insurance businesses until it was repealed in 1999. See
Wilmarth, supra note 150, at 219–22 (noting that while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act formally
abrogated the GSA in 1999, federal bank regulators had by that point already eviscerated its
force through regulatory accommodation).
277See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
278See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
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antitrust law but also the core functions of financial regulation—namely,
macroprudential systemic financial stability and microprudential safety-
and-soundness of financial institutions. But lawmakers have largely chosen
not to use structural reform to bolster the system’s resilience. Instead they
have continued to focus on incremental changes designed to manage the
behavior of actors transacting in the increasingly complex, unstable, and
uncertain networks through which financial functions are conducted. Most
of the recent behavioral regulatory reform initiatives, both in the United
States and abroad, have centered on two objectives: (1) improving the
capital adequacy rules applicable to financial institutions and (2) limiting
the moral hazard of bailouts by providing clarity for regulators’ resolution
authority—that is, prescribing rules and procedures regarding what
happens when a large firm is liquidated.279 With each successive reform,
these behavioral tools either place greater demands on industry to provide
information or construct systems of increasingly particularized rules that
might ultimately bear scant rational relationship to their objectives.
B. Capital Requirements
Throughout the recent history of banking regulation, lawmakers and
regulators have focused on capital requirements as a tool of behavioral
regulation to promote safety and soundness.280 In order to construct a
coherent behavioral regulatory regime in the current complex market
environment, a familiar dynamic arises where regulators react to market
events by attempting to more narrowly tailor their capital regulation tools
so as to cover new proliferating risks as they are discovered. As a result, the
standard-setting and enforcement functions require intensive involvement
from industry. In the process, regulators are presented with an unenviable
choice: either ignore industry information and risk arbitrary regulation or
rely on industry information and risk complexity capture. Since the initial
imposition of generally applicable capital requirements in the 1980s, regu-
lators have consistently chosen the latter.
Capital adequacy regulation serves a twofold purpose. First, it
ensures that a loss buffer is present to absorb losses without threatening a
279Though legislative and regulatory efforts to restrain excessive executive pay are not the
subject of this article, they constitute another example of postcrisis behavioral regulation.
280See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 52, at 251 (stating that capital requirements are the central
set of restrictions and requirements designed to keep regulated banks safe and sound).
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bank’s solvency.281 Second, it operates as a “risk tax” by requiring a bank to
set aside funds for each new extension of credit.282 Though much of capital
regulation can be mind-bendingly Byzantine—for example, the system of
risk weights discussed in greater detail below—its basic mechanics are
surprisingly straightforward. Generally speaking, modern capital regula-
tion in the banking industry consists of two quantities and a relation, or
ratio, between them.283 The first quantity is the amount of “capital” that
comprises those claims that stand first in line to absorb future losses.
Historically, this quantity has consisted of stable funding sources thought
to be effective at absorbing losses, including most prominently common
equity and hybrid debt instruments, though the latter are being phased
out by bank regulators after they proved ineffective loss absorbers in
2008.284 This quantity of regulatory capital is the numerator of the ratio.
The second quantity is a measure of the exposure to risk against
which the capital is intended to protect. This measurement, referred to as
“risk-weighted assets,”285 comprises the denominator of the ratio. Holding
all else equal, a bank will register a higher measure of risk exposure for
$10 billion of assets perceived to be risky, such as loans to corporations and
281Weber, Internal Models, supra note 242, at 792–93. To accomplish the loss buffer effect,
capital instruments must both be capable of absorbing losses and serve as “patient” capital
that cannot be redeemed or exchanged when financial stress occurs. Id. at 798 n.38.
282See id. at 792–93. The metaphor of “setting aside funds” is imperfect because it assumes that
a bank’s funding remains constant. See Admati et al., Fallacies, supra note 20, at 10–11. It is
more accurate to say that the risk tax requires firms to either set aside funds or change their
capital structure by raising more funds; in either case, the expected return on equity (ROE)
is reduced. See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND BANK BEHAV-
IOUR: THE IMPACT OF THE BASLE ACCORD 15 (1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs_wp1.pdf. This ROE reduction is the risk tax.
283The systems of capital adequacy regulation in the insurance and securities industry operate
similarly. See Weber, Teleological Drift, supra note 242, at 61; Weber, Internal Models, supra note
242, at 830–35.
284See BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20, at 2 (“Innovative hybrid capital instruments with
an incentive to redeem through features such as step-up clauses, currently limited to 15% of
the Tier 1 capital base, will be phased out.”); Patrick Jenkins, Q&A: How Regulators Gave Banks
Eight Years to Strengthen Their Capital Structures, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at 18 (“In the
financial crisis many highly geared banks with a lot of non-equity (such as hybrid debt) in
their capital structures were left looking very weak because losses burnt through their
relatively thin equity cushions quickly.”).
285CARNELL ET AL., supra note 52, at 259–63.
716 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
junk bonds, than it would if it held $10 billion of assets perceived to be safe,
such as government bonds. The relation between the two consists of a
required minimum ratio of capital to that risk exposure.286 Thus, decreases
in capital—the numerator of the ratio—and increases in risk-weighted
assets—the denominator—cause the ratio to shrink. As the ratio shrinks
below statutorily specified trigger points, the regulator is empowered or
required to exercise greater control, eventually subjecting the firm to
resolution procedures.287
At this point, a clarification is in order as to why capital require-
ments, at least as they are currently designed, are better categorized as
behavioral regulation rather than structural regulation. It is theoretically
possible to require a loss buffer that would require banks to radically
restructure their business models such that the requirement would
amount to serious structural reform.288 For example, lawmakers could
design a system of capital requirements that would, in effect, require
banks to retrench from all activities that require high deployment of
286Arturo Estrella, A Prolegomenon to Future Capital Requirements, 1 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (1995), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028830.
287In the United States, the FDIC is in charge of enforcing the capital adequacy regime,
referred to as the prompt corrective action (PCA) regime. Congress created the PCA regime
in 1991 after the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s. The PCA regime was designed to
provide for mandatory and timely FDIC intervention, as well as least-cost resolution of failing
banks. Under PCA, the FDIC is required to take a series of actions as a bank’s capital level
declines past statutorily prescribed trigger points. See SKEEL, supra note 272, at 120. The
purpose of the PCA was to combat the tendency for regulators to forbear—that is, to put off
regulatory intervention in the hope that conditions improve or, more cynically, that regulated
banks fully implode on some other regulator’s watch—which greatly magnified losses to the
deposit insurance fund during the savings and loan debacle. See Lawrence G. Baxter,
Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions by the Federal Banking
Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 505, 528 (1993) (explaining the importance of the “triggers
for mandatory” action ushered in by the new PCA regime). While the PCA’s least-cost-
resolution requirement has likely limited losses to the deposit insurance fund without impos-
ing any offsetting inefficiencies, the FDIC’s record of PCA action has hardly been prompt. See
SKEEL, supra note 272, at 124 (noting that in two-thirds of bank closures during the recent
crisis, the FDIC’s first intervention came when the bank was placed into resolution—which is
the last required intervention step under the PCA).
288See Anonymous, Tarullo’s Capital Idea, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2011, at A18 (“The Occam’s
razor solution is to drop the micromanagement of bank business and instead have them build
a bigger capital cushion. As with [the] Basel III [Framework], any new capital requirements
would kick in gradually over many years, but markets would begin to respond to the
prospective changes immediately.”).
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leverage such as overnight repo borrowing and proprietary trading.289 A
mandate to maintain common equity of forty percent of total assets would
certainly do the trick.290 The example of capital requirements demon-
strates that policy makers can deploy the same regulatory tools to achieve
structural reform or behavioral regulation. The devil is in the details of
implementation. While structural reform through capital regulation is
possible, regulators in major banking jurisdictions have stopped well
short of imposing structural reform and have opted instead to use capital
requirements as a linchpin in a system of behavioral regulation. These
capital requirements are designed to impose a narrowly tailored, precise
risk tax on each of a bank’s risk exposures.
The purpose of the risk tax is to counteract instability in the banking
sector by discouraging firms from stockpiling riskier assets on a leveraged
basis. A regulatory intervention is necessary to accomplish this goal
because public safety nets, most prominently deposit insurance and access
to emergency liquidity at the Federal Reserve Banks’ discount window,
strip private-market participants such as stockholders and creditors of the
incentives to check a bank’s risk-taking.291 Because banks enjoy these
289The theoretical equivalence of a stringent capital requirement and forced separation by
regulatory command recalls Martin Weitzman’s observation that there is no a priori reason to
prefer either commands or fixed prices as a mode of regulatory control. See Martin Weitz-
man, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477–78 (1974). The ICB’s Interim Report
makes this point explicit: “One policy approach would be structural radicalism—for example
to require retail banking and wholesale and investment banking to be in wholly separate
firms. Another would be to be laisser-faire about structure and to seek to achieve stability by
very high capital requirements across the board.” INTERIM ICB REPORT, supra note 269, at 6.
290It should also be pointed out that an increase in capital requirements short of that required
to accomplish meaningful structural reform may nevertheless promote robustness to the
extent that it increases the loss-absorptive capacity of financial institutions. The experimental
research on market networks demonstrates an unambiguous link between low capitalization
and liquidity levels and financial instability. See supra notes 209–37 and accompanying text.
However, as discussed below in this part, enhancing robustness by increasing the numerator
of the capital ratio will be frustrated if the denominator remains subject to complexity capture
or arbitrary regulation. See infra notes 344–55 and accompanying text.
291In other words, a moral hazard problem emerges as a result of the safety net. Alan
Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
described the problem while testifying in the Senate:
The safety net—deposit insurance, as well as the discount window—has so lowered the
risks perceived by depositors as to make them relatively indifferent to the soundness of
the depository recipients of their funds, except in unusual circumstances[.] With deposi-
tors exercising insufficient discipline through the cost of deposits, the incentive of some
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government safety net subsidies, their creditors bear less risk of loss than
they would absent those safety nets.292 In the case of the largest banks that
have come to dominate the industry, the too-big-to-fail phenomenon—
which describes the reality that government will prevent the failure of a
systemically significant institution even when discount window and deposit
insurance prove insufficient bulwarks—the subsidy is even larger and
more distortive.293 Consequently, stockholders and creditors—the corpo-
rate stakeholders that direct corporate governance in nonfinancial
enterprises—are immunized from the consequences of losses and, in the
case of the creditors, default. The result is perverse incentives for banks to
take on excessive risks.294 The risk tax function of capital requirements
aims to impose discipline on banks that creditors, who are risk-averse since
their return on capital is not a function of the firm’s profitability, would
normally impose through monitoring and contractual covenants in loan
documentation and bond indentures. It does so by calibrating a firm’s
capital requirements to the perceived riskiness of its assets through the
risk-weighting system described above.295
banks’ owners to control risk-taking has been dulled. Profits associated with risk-taking
accrue to owners, while losses in excess of bank capital that would otherwise fall on
depositors are absorbed by the FDIC[.]
Testimony Before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 1–2 (1990) (statement
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/782/download/27814/Greenspan_19900712.pdf.
292Stockholders also benefit from the subsidy, particularly during boom periods of the credit
cycle, when the subsidies permit the bank to incur indebtedness at lower interest costs than
it would otherwise be required to pay absent a public safety net. This higher leverage
increases returns on equity because the bank is able to increase its earnings without expand-
ing its equity base.
293See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 174, at 80; King, supra note 1, at 4 (“The massive support
extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster,
has created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.”); Harvey Rosenblum, Choosing the
Road to Prosperity: Why WeMust End Too Big to Fail—Now, in 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 3, 17 (2011), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/
fed/annual/2011/ar11.pdf (“[Too-big-to-fail] banks’ sheer size and their presumed guarantee
of government help in time of crisis have provided a significant edge—perhaps a percentage
point or more—in the cost of raising funds.”).
294The risks are excessive only from a societal standpoint, due to the instability they engender
with core payments functions and steady credit supply. From the standpoint of bank creditors
and stockholders, the risks might even be optimal.
295See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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The history of capital regulation in the United States, especially risk
weighting, is one of increasing systematization and particularity. But pre-
scriptive law is limited in its capacity to anticipate events in complex
systems that, like the wetness of water, have properties that are more than
the sum of their parts. The inherent limitations of a system of behavioral
regulation administered by boundedly rational regulators have become
increasingly evident in recent decades.
The first hundred years of federal banking regulation lacked any
ongoing supervision of capital levels.296 From the passage of the National
Bank Act of 1864, which first authorized federally chartered banks,297
until the International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA) of 1983, bank
regulators lacked authority to impose any such requirements.298 ILSA
296An exception to this general rule is the regulation of savings and loan associations, which
under section 403(b) of the Federal Housing Act of 1934 (FHA) were required at all times to
maintain capital reserves in an amount of at least five percent of all amounts insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the FDIC analogue for the S&L industry
before it was merged into the FDIC in 1989, in the wake of the savings and loan crisis). See
National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73–479, tit. IV, §403(b), 48 Stat. 1246, 1258 (1934). Also, as
early as the 1950s, other U.S. bank regulators developed risk-sensitive leverage ratios for
internal informational purposes. See Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A
Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1299, 1317 (1989) (noting that in the 1950s the FRB began to use a “simplistic” capital-to-
adjusted-risk analysis for internal purposes); see also EUGENE N. WHITE, THE COMPTROLLER AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BANKING: 1960–1990, at 30, 75 n.40 (1992) (describing the
OCC’s 1974 “Victor program,” which compared “classified loans”—defined as “100 percent of
substandard loans, fifty percent of loans especially mentioned [and] fifty percent of doubtful
loans”—to total adjusted capital in order to individuate troubled national banks; those banks
with a ratio in excess of sixty-five percent would automatically receive special attention).
297See An Act to Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge of United States Bonds,
and to Provide for the Circulation and Redemption Thereof, 38th Cong., ch. 106, §§ 5–63,
13 Stat. 99, 100–18 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of chapter 2 of 12
U.S.C.) (authorizing formation of national banking associations and setting forth the statutory
regime governing their formation and operations). Ten years later, Congress formally des-
ignated the 1864 Act as the National Bank Act. An Act Fixing the Amount of United States
Notes, Providing a Redistribution of the National-Bank Currency, and for Other Purposes,
43d Cong., ch. 343, § 1, 18 Stat. 123 (1874) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 38).
298See International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 98 Pub. L. 181, § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat.
1153, 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)) (“Each appropriate Federal banking agency
shall have the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a banking institution
as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be necessary or
appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution.”). Prior to the
enactment of ILSA, each of the FRB, OCC, and FDIC had published capital adequacy
guidelines in response to the Latin American sovereign debt crisis, but the statutory
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empowered regulators to establish generally applicable minimum bank
capital levels.299 The ILSA also provided (1) that a bank’s failure to
maintain prescribed capital adequacy standards may be deemed an
“unsafe and unsound” practice, which would trigger the formal enforce-
ment powers of federal banking regulators300 and (2) that each federal
banking regulator could require a bank to submit and adhere to a capital
improvement plan that is acceptable to the regulator.301
By 1985, each of the FDIC, the OCC, and the FRB had promulgated
under its ILSA authorization minimum capital standards for banks within
its regulatory purview.302 In January 1986, U.S. banking regulators
authorization for these regulatory standards was unclear. In response to the Latin American
sovereign debt crisis that eventually prompted Congress to enact ILSA, each of the FRB, the
OCC, and the FDIC published capital adequacy guidelines, but the statutory authorization of
these regulatory standards was unclear. See Joint News Release of Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and Federal Reserve Board, reprinted in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) § 5554A, at 3406
(Dec. 17, 1981); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statement of Policy on Capital
Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,693 (Dec. 28, 1981). The seventeen banks with assets in excess of
$15 billion were not covered by this guidance, as their capital levels were at the time of
publication below the levels set forth in the guidance. In 1983, the agencies removed this
large bank exception. TARULLO, supra note 20, at 36–37.
299§ 908(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)). Some contemporary commentators ascribed to
this particular provision a congressional intent to shield cease-and-desist orders regarding
capital from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) “substantial
evidence” standard. See Jack S. Older & Howard N. Cayne, Capital Standards: Regulators Wield
Big New Stick, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 30, 1984, at 11 (discussing First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 685–86 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the portion of an OCC cease-and-desist order premised on
failure to maintain adequate capital levels was not supported by substantial evidence under
APA review); see also KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., 2–23 BANKING LAW § 23.08 (2009) (“This broad
Congressional authorization came in response to, and effectively overruled, the decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in First National Bank of Bellaire v.
Comptroller of the Currency.”). No longer would bank regulators face the prospect of judicial
review of their determinations regarding adequate capitalization.
300§ 908(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1)).
301Id. § 908(b)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(2)(B)).
302Membership of State Banking Institutions, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057 (Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB);
Capital Maintenance, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,128 (Mar. 19, 1985) (FDIC); Minimum Capital Ratios;
Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,207 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC). Under the FHA, savings
and loan associations had been subject to a statutory capital requirement since 1934. See supra
note 296. In 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, which established the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) within the
U.S. Department of the Treasury as the successor agency to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) and applied ILSA provisions to the OTS. See Financial Institutions Reform,
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announced a plan to unilaterally implement a risk-based capital adequacy
regime that took into account the various risks to which banks’ capital
bases are subject.303 By the mid-1980s, Congress had transformed the
regulation of capital from a matter of ad hoc enforcement actions to “an
ongoing feature of basic bank supervisory policy.”304 An equally important
matter was that by formalizing regulatory capital adequacy standards and
homogenizing their vocabulary, ILSA had set the ground for coordination
among U.S. regulators vis-à-vis their international counterparts, which
assumed tremendous importance in the post-ILSA era of international
banking.
While the foregoing summary traces the gradual emergence of
capital as a primary regulatory concern for ensuring bank solvency, ten-
sions embedded within the post-ILSA capital framework persist today.
First, the minimum capital requirements established by the FRB, the OCC,
and the FDIC pursuant to ILSA lacked sophisticated risk sensitivity, in
spite of the significant financial innovation and concomitant accretions to
risk and complexity in international banking. Second, the United States
was the first major economy to establish minimum capital standards for its
domestic banks, which created a regulatory imbalance that affected inter-
national capital flows by causing international banking business to migrate
offshore—especially to Japan—where capital regulation was virtually non-
existent.305 The federal banking regulators in effect imposed a risk tax on
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–73, §§ 101(6), 201(b), 301, 103 Stat.
183, 187–88, 277–94, 302–04 (substituting the OTS for the FHLBB and adding sections 3–5
to the amended Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 to establish the OTS and direct it to subject
savings and loan associations to ILSA capital adequacy regulation). The Dodd-Frank Act
folded the OTS into the OCC. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 313–314. 124 Stat. 1376.
303The American Association of Bankers objected strenuously to this proposal on grounds that
were based on international competition rather than the risk sensitivity concept itself. Spe-
cifically, the U.S. banking industry was chary to incur another capital charge when it was
already reeling from aggressive Japanese pricing in the international lending market. See
John D. Wagster, Impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on International Banks, 51 J. FIN. 1321, 1333
(1996).
304Michael P. Malloy, Capital Adequacy and Regulatory Objectives, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
299, 302 (2002).
305See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 447, 500–03 (2008); Sun Bae Kim & Ramon Moreno, Stock Prices and Bank Lending
Behavior in Japan, 1994 ECON. REV.–FED. RES. BANK S.F. 31, 32; Weber, Internal Models, supra
note 242, at 801.
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U.S.-based banks, which now had to withhold capital as a reserve for each
new extension of a loan, without any restrictions keeping capital from
migrating offshore. To address each of these problems, the U.S. banking
policy establishment pushed international policy coordination under the
auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, eventually
resulting in the 1988 Basel Accord.306
The 1988 Basel Accord set a minimum capital-to-risk-weighted assets
ratio of eight percent.307 More importantly for present purposes, it divided
all banking assets into five categories, each of which carried a different risk
weight according to its perceived credit risk.308 Each risk category carried
a specified risk-weighting factor—0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, or 100%.309 Bank
assets considered to pose a low credit risk, such as U.S. Treasury securities,
received a zero percent risk weighting—that is, they were not added into
the denominator of the capital-to-risk exposure ratio—and other assets
representing incrementally higher credit risk received higher risk
weights.310 For example, claims against Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development banks and securities issued by state and
local governments each received a twenty percent risk weight; revenue
bonds issued by state and local governments and first mortgage loans on
one-to-four family residences each received a fifty percent risk weight;
and property, plant, and equipment, as well as most loans to households
and corporate borrowers, received a 100% risk weight.311 Amounts at risk
pursuant to off-balance-sheet items such as contingent liabilities and
derivative instruments would be multiplied by a “credit conversion factor”
that reflected the Basel Committee’s judgment of the likelihood that
the off-balance-sheet item will give rise to a balance sheet liability.312 The
306See Gadinis, supra note 305, at 502–03.
307See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASURE-
MENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 14 (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf.
308See id. at 8. The 1988 Basel Accord’s focus on credit risk reflected the then-current
perception that credit risk posed the greatest risk to bank solvency. See id. at 8–9 (“For most




312Id. at 23–27. “Credit conversion factors” were applied to the replacement cost rather than
the nominal amounts of derivative instruments. Id. at 12–13.
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normal risk weights applicable to the counterparty were then applied to
the resulting amounts to yield the required capital to be held against the
off-balance sheet item.313 However, an additional fifty percent reduction
applied to most derivative instruments—though the Committee promised
to “keep a close eye on the credit quality of participants in [derivatives]
markets and reserve[d] the right to raise the weights if average credit
quality deteriorate[d] or if loss experience increase[d].”314
While the ink was drying on the 1988 Basel Accord, bank regulators
began to perceive that its five crude “risk buckets” failed to take account of
new innovations in the banking business, particularly asset securitization
and derivatives. Moreover, the exclusive focus on credit default risk meant
that there was no risk tax to counteract the increasing levels of market risk
and operational risk that were building up in the ever-larger universal
banking conglomerates.315 FDICIA, which statutorily implemented the
1988 Basel Accord into U.S. law,316 addressed some of these omissions and
required U.S. federal banking agencies to revise their risk-based capital
standards for insured depository institutions to ensure that these stan-
dards take account of interest rate risk, concentration of credit risk, and
the risks of “nontraditional activities.”317
313Id. at 23–24.
314Id. at 27.
315Market risk, as defined by the Basel Committee, describes “the risk of losses in on and
off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices.” BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1
(2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf. The buildup of market risk in bank
asset portfolios resulted from the shift from core lending activities to so-called “noninterest
income.” See FED. DEP. INS. CORP., REGIONAL OUTLOOK, BANKING RISK IN THE NEW ECONOMY 11
(2nd Qtr. 2000) (noting an increasing proportion of earnings from noninterest sources by
FDIC-insured banks); BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE SUPERVISORY TREATMENT OF
MARKET RISKS 1 (1993), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs11a.pdf (“[C]hanges in tech-
nology, in market practices and in the nature of many ‘banking’ activities have made it even
more important that the 1988 Accord be broadened to take into account market risk.”); id. at
4 (“Deregulation of interest rates and capital controls, the liberalisation of banks’ permitted
range of activities and the rapid development of financial markets have all increased the
opportunities for banks to incur market risks. In particular, banks’ trading in derivative
products has continued to grow at a rapid rate.”); Weber, Internal Models, supra note 242,
at 805–06.
316FDICIA was also the legislation that created the PCA regime. See supra note 287.
317See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–
242, § 305(b), 105 Stat. 2236. The FDICIA did not address operational risk.
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A year after Congress enacted FDICIA, the Basel Committee began
considering how to integrate market risk into the 1988 Basel Accord.318 In
1996, the Basel Committee published its market risk amendments to the
1988 Basel Accord,319 in which the Committee acquiesced to industry
demands that the amendments allow banks to set their market risk capital
requirements by reference to the firm’s internal risk estimates. Banks had
lamented that the standardized formula-based approach that the Commit-
tee had initially proposed was too prescriptive—indeed, even “bureau-
cratic and antiquated.”320 Many bank regulators at the time were no less
impressed with banks’ internal proprietary risk measurement capacities
than the banks themselves. Alan Greenspan is best associated with this
position. During 1994 Congressional testimony, Greenspan provided a
preview for the 1996 market risk amendments, noting the following:
Although the market risks of many banking instruments, including many
derivative contracts, can be accurately assessed using . . . simple models [such as
the initial 1988 Basel Accord formulae to calculate credit risk capital require-
ments], a considerably more sophisticated approach is necessary to assess more
complex instruments, especially those with options characteristics[,] and to
aggregate different categories of market risk[.] The recognition of the need for
a more sophisticated approach has led banking regulators in the United States
and abroad to explore carefully the potential for allowing banks to use their own
internal models to assess the need for capital to cover market risk[.]321
The 1996 market risk amendments presaged the so-called Basel II
Framework, a more radical and comprehensive 2004 reform that dramati-
cally reworked the risk-weighting methodology of the initial 1988 Basel
Accord and permitted banks to set capital requirements with respect to
credit risk by reference to their own internal estimates of risks.322 It also
required, for the first time, a regulatory capital charge with respect to
318See Weber, Internal Models, supra note 242, at 822.
319See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE
MARKET RISKS (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf.
320See Tracy Corrigan, Searching for Consensus on Risk Assessment, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1994,
at 30.
321Testimony before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103rd
Cong. 11 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys.), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/805/download/27981/Greenspan-
19940525.pdf.
322See Weber, Internal Models, supra note 242, at 826–29.
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operational risks, also to be assessed by banks’ internal risk-management
functions.323 In this respect, like the FDICIA a decade earlier, it expanded
both the granularity of the risk weights and the range of risks taken into
account. In the process, the Basel capital regime expanded from the initial
thirty-page 1988 Basel Accord324 to a sprawling 347-page Basel II Frame-
work,325 rife with complicated mathematical formulae.326
With the Basel II Framework, the Committee published formulae
that banks were required to use in computing their capital requirements
for credit risk, but banks were permitted to determine the values to assign
to the key variables on their own. Banks electing to perform these func-
tions on their own would be subject to a modified “internal ratings-based”
(IRB) capital regime.327 Thus, under the IRB regime, the amount of
capital a bank needs to support a given exposure would depend on the
bank’s own assessment of the probability of default (PD), the exposure at
risk (EAD), and the loss given default (LGD) with respect to that expo-
sure.328 For banks not subject to the IRB approach, their capital require-
ments would continue to be set by a “standardized” formula-based
approach that prescribed how the parameters were calculated in excruci-
ating detail.329 The one exception to the IRB’s outsourcing of credit assess-
ment to regulated industry was the treatment of securitization exposures.
323See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 133–34 (2009),
324See supra note 307.
325Including “The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double
Default Effects” and the “Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks,”
each of which is incorporated into the Basel II Framework, the page total sums to an even 500
pages. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS—A REVISED FRAMEWORK (COMPREHENSIVE VERSION) 5
(2006) [hereinafter BASEL II FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
326To provide a typical example, the formula below determines the capital requirement




























327See Weber, Internal Models, supra note 242, at 827.
328BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 325, at 52.
329See id. at 19.
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For these exposures, the Committee instructed regulators to set capital
requirements by reference to external credit ratings published by the
credit rating agencies.330
Whether looking at securitization or nonsecuritization assets, a
common theme runs throughout the Basel II Framework: as asset markets
become too complex for regulators to set finely grained capital require-
ments based on risk assessments, regulators grant discretion to parties
perceived to have better access to and ability to process relevant informa-
tion. With the Basel II Framework, the Committee expressed its belief that
the trend in bank capital regulation would be in the direction of increased
reliance on internal estimates of risk and decreased reliance on regulatory
command. In particular, the Basel II Framework states that
the [internal ratings-based] approach represents a point on the continuum
between purely regulatory measures of credit risk and an approach that builds
more fully on internal credit risk models. In principle, further movements
along that continuum are foreseeable, subject to an ability to address
adequately concerns about reliability, comparability, validation, and competi-
tive equity.331
Later that year, the SEC took that trend to its logical end in its
Consolidated Supervised Entities Program, which did away with regulator-
prescribed formulae altogether and allowed securities firms that are
subject to SEC capital regulation to set their net capital requirements
entirely on their own.332
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury Timothy Geithner framed the response in terms of capital
330Id. at 133–36 (providing that capital requirements related to securitization exposures that
are either rated or for which an “inferred rating” may be postulated due to similarities with
a rated exposure are to be set by reference to external credit ratings). Other securitization
exposures carry capital requirements that are set by reference to either external ratings or a
highly detailed and prescriptive “supervisory formula.” See id. at 134, 136–44 (providing that
liquidity facilities and credit enhancements, which by their nature are unrated and ineligible
to use the “inferred rating” approach, carry capital requirements that are “mapped to
equivalent external ratings” and that all other securitization exposures carry capital require-
ments as set forth in the “supervisory formula”).
331Id. at 5.
332See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consoli-
dated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
240 (2012)); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have
a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 735–36 (2009).
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regulation, urging Congress during the lead-up to the Dodd-Frank Act
debate that “[t]he top three things to get done are capital, capital and
capital.”333 The Dodd-Frank Act, among many other things, clarifies that
systemically important financial institutions, even if they are not banks, will
be subject to capital requirements and FRB supervision.334 But lawmakers
declined to amend capital requirements legislatively, preferring instead to
defer to the Basel Committee, as urged by the U.S. Treasury and banking
industry.335
For its part, the Basel Committee observed that “[o]ne of the key
lessons of the crisis has been the need to strengthen the risk coverage of
the capital framework.”336 The Committee also expressly acknowledged
that increasing the risk sensitivity of the capital regime would require
consideration of the network effects of contagion: “[E]xcessive intercon-
nectedness among systemically important banks . . . transmitted shocks
across the financial system and economy.”337 In the immediate aftermath of
the crisis, the Committee published a document entitled Enhancements to the
Basel II Framework (Basel II Enhancements),338 and by the end of 2010 it
had published a more comprehensive amendment to the Basel II Frame-
work known as the Basel III Framework.339
These documents, particularly the Basel III Framework, are note-
worthy for reasons other than their revisions to the risk-weighting of
assets. For example, the Basel III Framework also (1) imposes for the first
time at the Basel Committee level a leverage ratio and two liquidity ratios,
referred to as the “net stable funding” ratio and the “liquidity coverage”
ratio;340 (2) restricts the set of instruments that count as “capital” for
333David Leonhardt, Heading off the Next Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 28, 2010, at 36.
334See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
335See Simon Johnson, The Big Banks Fight on, NYTIMES.COM (June 15, 2011, 5:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/the-big-banks-fight-on/.
336BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20, at 3.
337Id. at 7.
338BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK (2009)
[hereinafter BASEL II ENHANCEMENTS], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf.
339BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20.
340See id. at 4, 8–9, 61–63. The U.S. bank laws have imposed a leverage ratio since FDICIA was
enacted in 1991. See Baxter, supra note 287, at 516.
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purposes of setting the numerator of the capital ratio to exclude certain
instruments that proved to be poor loss absorbers during the crisis;341 (3)
increases the base amounts of capital that banks must maintain and
introduces a new “capital conservation buffer”;342 and (4) provides for a
new countercyclical capital buffer that will wax and wane with the credit
cycle.343 But the entire architecture of the capital regulation regime
depends on the interaction of the required ratios, the definition of capital,
and the risk-weighting methodology. It will, ceteris paribus, enhance finan-
cial stability to increase the required capital ratio or to ratchet up the
loss-absorption capacity of capital instruments. But if the risk-weighting
methodologies are not sound, the system will nevertheless behave in
unpredictable ways or, at worst, be only arbitrarily connected with its
regulatory purpose. Modest adjustments to the capital ratio will not matter
where “the ‘riskiness’ of a bank’s activities and the liquidity of its funding
can change suddenly and radically as market expectations shift.”344 In
those circumstances, “what appeared to be an adequate capital or liquidity
cushion one day appears wholly inadequate the next.”345
The Basel III Framework’s treatment of risk weighting continues the
Committee’s dialectic practice of identifying new risks and addressing
them by increasing the granularity of risk weights, expanding the range of
risks covered, and ultimately delegating discretion to industry. The vector
of reform is always in the direction of ever more complicated formulae and
increased industry discretion. The Committee’s approach to “resecuritisa-
tion” risk weights shows this dynamic in operation. The 2009 Basel II
Enhancements define resecuritization as “a securitisation exposure in
which the risk associated with an underlying pool of exposures is tranched
and at least one of the underlying exposures is a securitisation expo-
sure.”346 Prior to the Basel III Framework, resecuritizations were treated
341See BASEL III FRAMEWORK, supra note 20, at 2–3, 12–27.
342See id. at 6–7, 54–57.
343See id. at 5–6, 57–60.
344King, supra note 1, at 4.
345Id.
346BASEL II ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 338, at 2.
2012 / Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture 729
the same as securitizations, and their risk weights were to be calculated in
virtually the same manner as ordinary securitization exposures.347
By incorporating resecuritization exposures in the capital accord,
the Committee addressed a key source of financial instability: the collater-
alized debt obligation (CDO). CDOs are securities constructed from pools
of debt obligations, including securitized debt securities such as the resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that wreaked so much havoc in
the 2008 financial crisis.348 By arranging and distributing CDOs, invest-
ment and commercial banks reaped large fees and increased the total
exposure to the mortgage market.349 They even constructed “synthetic”
CDOs—derivative securities, the returns of which tracked referenced
securitized debt, but which were not actually backed by the collateral.350 At
the tail end of the credit bubble, CDO-squared and CDO-cubed transac-
tions, involving CDOs of CDOs of CDOs, gained popularity.351 Troubles
with the CDO market ramified to the CDS markets too. The collapse of
AIG was triggered indirectly by defaults in certain tranches of CDOs,
which triggered an obligation on the part of an AIG affiliate to make its
CDS contract holders whole.352
347The only reference to resecuritization exposures in the Basel II Framework is a specifica-
tion of how two particular formulae would apply in the case of a resecuritization exposure. See
BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 325, at 141. Prior to the Basel II Enhancements, the Basel II
Framework provided no formal definition of what a resecuritization exposure was in the first
place. The formulae were only applicable in the case of a bank using the “supervisory
formula” to calculate its securitization-exposure capital requirement. See supra note 330 and
accompanying text. In the cases of any rated resecuritization exposure such as a rated
collateralized debt obligation, a bank using the IRB approach would be required to calculate
the capital requirement by reference to the external rating. See id.




352See Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra
note 155, at 283, 299–300. The details of the AIG collapse are well beyond the scope of this
article, but it bears mention that they read like a case study of a multidimensional “normal
accident.” The losses on the CDS contracts on their own did not cause AIG to collapse.
Instead, AIG’s CDS obligations required it to fork over significant amounts of capital. That,
in turn, resulted in other counterparties demanding that AIG comply with the terms of
nondefaulting CDS contracts that required AIG to post collateral in the event its financial
condition deteriorated, to compensate counterparties for the added credit risk. At a certain
point, it became obvious AIG could not satisfy all the collateral calls, and government
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In response to the incremental risk posed by the CDO innovation,
the Committee created two more categories of securitization exposures, as
illustrated by Figure 4353 and Figure 5.354 The response was to require
increases in the amount of capital to be held against these CDO-type
exposures. Because the committee sought to impose new risk taxes to
newly discovered risks, its approach is prototypical behavioral regulation.
Moreover, the continued delegation of authority to the credit rating
agencies shows that the regulators have been overwhelmed by market
complexity.
The enhanced securitization risk-weighting framework simply layers
an additional set of risk weights onto an already highly particularized
risk-weighting matrix. Because the applicable weights depend on third-
party rating agencies’ assessments of risk, it is no exaggeration to say that
institutions bailed out AIG to prevent the possible default on all of AIG’s CDS contracts,
which threatened to “cause a fire sale of assets that could ripple across the financial system.”
Id. The regulator responsible for supervising the AIG holding company conceded, “‘We
missed the impact’ of the collateral call triggers. It was the triggers—not actual credit losses
on the company’s credit default swaps—that ultimately brought AIG down.” ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 155, at 223 (quoting C.K. Lee, managing director of Complex and International
Organizations at OTS). Lee’s comments portray a normal accident that was at first unpre-
dictable yet also, in retrospect, inevitable. Moreover, the comments demonstrate the difficul-
ties involved in supervising large, complex financial institutions.
353BASEL II ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 338, at 135.
354Id. at 3.
Figure 4. Basel II Securitization Risk Weights under IRB Approach.
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a capital requirement associated with a securitization exposure is con-
structed from a highly imprecise risk weight based on an imperfect, rough
proxy for credit risk. The Basel Committee’s response to increasing com-
plexity has been to replace the initial Accord’s five “risk buckets” into
which all bank exposures were allocated with (1) the IRB approach, which
represents a dramatic outsourcing of the risk-weighting function to indus-
try, and (2) an additional layer of risk weights to address risks not covered
in the Basel II Framework. Consider the example of resecuritization and
CDOs. If the spread of contagion in the CDO market during 2008 was a
complex event that occurred due to unpredictable network effects among
the transacting parties in the housing, RMBS, and CDO markets, then
there is little hope that trebling the capital requirements for resecuritiza-
tion exposures will prevent a future similar event. Instead, by pre-
committing to a system of risk weighting as behavioral regulation, the
Basel Committee has opted for an immanently dysfunctional regulatory
regime.
The emphasis on capital requirements is puzzling in many respects.
Greater uncertainty complicates both the risk-tax and loss-buffer objectives
of capital adequacy regulation. Balance sheet opacity, leverage, and dense
network interconnections among firms and markets, by frustrating or even
preventing an ex ante assessment of risk, make calibrating the risk tax
much more difficult. In turn, as the effects of the risk tax become more
uncertain, the greater the loss buffer must be to achieve the desired
protective effect. Not surprisingly, opinions vary drastically as to the
Figure 5. “Enhanced” Securitization Risk Weights under IRB Approach.
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appropriate level of capital buffers.355 In a sense, the loss buffer is a gauge
more of regulators’ uncertainty about the risk tax calibration and less a
precise determination of the absolute level of capital sufficient to keep the
firm operating under severe conditions. In this respect, the Basel Com-
mittee is to be applauded for insisting that banks hold increased amounts
of loss-absorbent capital. Whether it will be enough is, for at least as long
as conditions of complexity predominate in financial markets, largely
unpredictable.
C. Living Wills
Another linchpin of the postcrisis financial reform toolkit has been the
“living will.” One of the main shortcomings of the precrisis regulatory
regime was the inability of regulators to resolve and wind down systemi-
cally significant institutions. As a result, regulators cajoled lawmakers into
massive commitments of public capital to bail out the insolvent institutions
and preserve the continued viability of core financial functions. “Faced
with a complex and opaque structure, authorities have little choice but to
rescue the whole bank” rather than isolate and wind down problematic
units on their own.356 Living wills are designed to prevent bailouts by
setting forth in advance the steps by which a firm will be resolved in an
orderly manner over a weekend in the event of insolvency.357 Bailouts are
not required when it is possible to “dismantle a bank in a way that doesn’t
damage the system.”358 The living will regulatory technique is inspired by
the concept of modularity,359 but it is vulnerable to complexity capture. As
355This is due in part to the political nature of setting the required capital levels. See supra
note 20.
356Emilios Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action 3 (Duisenberg School of Finance,
Policy Paper No. 4, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533808.
357See Ron Feldman, Forcing Financial Institution Change Through Credible Recovery/Resolution
Plans: An Alternative to Plan-Now/Implement-Later Living Wills (Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis,
Econ. Pol’y Paper No. 10–2, 2010), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/eppapers/
10–2/eppaper10–2_wills.pdf.
358Henny Sender, Dimon Backs Means to Close down Banks, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, at 4
(reporting remarks of Jamie Dimon, Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan Chase, the second-
largest U.S. banking conglomerate, in favor of a comprehensive resolution mechanism for
large banks).
359See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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with capital requirements, regulators will allow banks themselves to
prepare their living wills on the grounds that banks rather than regulators
have access to information on their susceptibility to contagion. Hence the
living wills will be as effective as industry wants them to be.
When contagion is spreading rapidly throughout financial markets,
resolving affected firms is a necessary first step in containing the contagion.
But where those markets and firms are characterized by complexity, it
threatens an insurmountable challenge. The effects of resolving a single
firm might cause ripple effects throughout the financial system in ways that
are impossible for the regulators to predict. These “channels of contagion”
include (1) opaque and dynamic-state interconnectedness with other large
financial institutions, (2) the potential inability of an insolvent firm to
continue to provide systemically important services as it is resolved, and (3)
the legal complexity of resolving a large, internationally active conglom-
erate where both domestic and foreign regulators scramble to preserve the
value of affected operations within their respective jurisdictional pur-
views.360 Greater ex ante certainty of what will happen in the event of
insolvency might promise to mitigate the harm from the first and
third channels. As for the second channel, it might be possible to provide
an ex ante framework pursuant to which any systemically important
business units are easily separated from other business units and are able
to run on an independent basis regardless of financial stress at their
affiliates.
The Group of Twenty (G20) nations included living wills as a high-
priority reform in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis,
calling on G20 governments to rapidly develop “internationally consistent,
firm-specific recovery and resolution plans.”361 In the United States,
section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act now requires large bank holding
360Richard J. Herring, Wind-Down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts: The Cross-Border Challenges,
in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 125, 128 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds.,
2009) (“The plan should also identify operational interdependencies such as IT systems,
liquidity, and risk management procedures that would impede the separation of one unit
from another.”).
361U.K. CHAIR OF THE G20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIONS OF THE
LONDON, WASHINGTON, AND PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMITS, para. 45 (2009), available at http://
blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/progress-report-economic-and-financial-actions-
london-washington-and-pittsburgh-g20-sum.
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companies and conglomerates designated by the FSOC as systemically
significant nonbank financial companies to “report periodically to the
[FSOC], the Board of Governors, and the [FDIC] the plan of such
company for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial
distress of failure.”362 Congress included certain minimum requirements
for the living wills, including as follows:
(A) information regarding the manner and extent to which any insured
depository institution affiliated with the company is adequately pro-
tected from risks arising from the activities of any nonbank subsidiar-
ies of the company;
(B) full descriptions of the ownership structure, assets, liabilities, and
contractual obligations of the company; [and]
(C) identification of the cross-guarantees tied to different securities, iden-
tification of major counterparties, and a process for determining to
whom the collateral of the company is pledged . . . .363
One glaring omission from the Dodd-Frank Act is any express
requirement that the living will—or “resolution plan” in Dodd-Frank
parlance364—identify operational interdependences such as those related
to information technology (IT) and risk management.365
The FSA moved faster even than the United States, requiring its six
largest banks to submit resolution plans in 2009.366 It mandated that the
banks’ plans meet three requirements. First, they need to outline which
businesses and subsidiaries they would sell to raise emergency funds.
Second, they must include a “contingent resolution plan” for transferring
client assets to a third party in a crisis. Third, they must stipulate how they
362Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 165(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376.
363Id. § 165(d)(1)(A)–(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365(d)(1)(A)–(C) (Supp. 2011)).
364Id. § 165(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (Supp. 2011)).
365Cf. Herring, supra note 360, at 135–36. In fact, during discussions with the U.K.’s Financial
Services Authority (FSA) over its IT infrastructure, a major U.K. bank discovered it possessed
a single global license to Microsoft Office, so its various subsidiaries would be unable to
communicate if the parent were liquidated. Brooke Masters, Resistance to Living Wills Could
Prove Futile and Foolish, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at 16.
366See Masters, supra note 365; Brooke Masters & Gillian Tett, U.K. Regulators Step up Efforts to
Force Banks to Compile Living Wills, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at 15.
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would liquidate the assets on their trading book within sixty days.367 In the
meantime, the FSA has published draft rules that would require more than
250 financial institutions to propose such plans to the FSA by the end of
2012.368 U.S. bank regulators promulgated a final rule implementing
section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act in November 2011.369
It is anticipated that the living wills proposed by banks and other
financial institutions will be the starting point for discussions with regula-
tors over their viability.370 In the United States, for example, when the
FDIC and the FRB believe a living will does not facilitate an orderly
resolution of the proposing firm, they may require a firm to resubmit a
plan and, if the deficiencies are not remediated, order the firm to “divest
certain assets or operations . . . to facilitate an orderly resolution of such
company” in the event of its failure.371 The FSA enjoys similar authority to
require a firm to simplify its opaque structure if the FSA adjudges a living
will proposal to be unlikely to facilitate orderly resolution.372
A heavy informational, analytical, and computational burden thus
falls onto the regulators’ shoulders. Rick Herring describes the regulators’
new responsibilities under the living will laws as follows:
[T]he primary supervisor must evaluate the wind-down plan in detail (if
appropriate with a national college of supervisors). It must certify that the plan
is feasible, and the estimated time for the wind-down is plausible and accept-
able. In addition, it must ensure that all systemically important activities have
been identified and properly insulated, so that they could be spun off to
another firm in the event of insolvency.373
367Masters & Tett, supra note 366.
368Masters, supra note 365.
369Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323 (Nov. 1, 2011) (relating to FDIC and FRB).
370See Avgouleas et al., supra note 356, at 2 (“[T]here should be discussions between a bank
and its supervisors about winding down its operations in crisis times, and forcing a bank to
simplify its often opaque structure.”).
371Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 165(d)(5), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365(d)(4) (Supp. 2011)).
372FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TURNER REVIEW CONFERENCE DISCUSSION PAPER: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS: SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS AND ASSESSING THE CUMULATIVE
IMPACT 27–28 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_04.pdf.
373Herring, supra note 360, at 137.
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Ron Feldman, a senior regulator at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, notes in a brief article on living wills that “bank supervisors
would identify those attributes of financial institution operations, structure
and funding that curtail effective, bailout-free recovery or resolution.”374
In other words, for the living will regime to function properly bank
regulators need to identify where complexity in relevant markets and
institutions might require government intervention to protect the integrity
of core financial functions.
Here again lawmakers have charged regulators with a mandate to
regulate behaviors and promote stability in domains characterized by
normal accidents, phase transitions, hidden embedded properties, and
punctuated equilibria. Of course it will be possible to reprimand derelict
banks that make little attempt at all to submit a meaningful living will, but
in the vast majority of cases a regulator will be hard pressed to identify
specific reasons why a living will’s resolution plan is not “feasible” and
its timeframe is not “plausible and acceptable.” To do so would require
anticipation of the events that might precipitate financial distress at
the bank.
The great promise of living wills is that, by drafting them, banks will
confront their operational complexity before financial distress materializes
and will decide to streamline operations. Such streamlined operations
should, in turn, facilitate regulatory tasks of supervision and resolution.
But banks currently are able to externalize the costs of their complexity
onto taxpayers, and the policy establishment is committed to behavioral
regulation rather than meaningful structural reform. Given that back-
ground, banks will likely propose half-hearted living wills without any
meaningful organizational deliberation of in extremis events.375 Regulators
will then bear the rhetorical burden of establishing that a bank’s practices
are likely to prevent orderly resolution. Their bounded rationality in these
matters will likely prevent them from formulating the responses, and the
complexity capture problem will persist. The central objection here is that
resolving complex operations is at a minimum exceedingly difficult and
perhaps impossible; structural proposals such as the ICB’s “retail ring
374Feldman, supra note 357, at 2.
375See SKEEL, supra note 272, at 141 (“[M]anagers are unlikely to devise serious and realistic
plans unless regulators are unusually vigilant in enforcing the new obligation [to draft a
living will].”).
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fence” reform make the resolution process easier by “[s]eparating activities
. . . especially because those services whose continuous provision isessential
[to the economy] tend not to be those whose complexity makes resolution
difficult.”376
CONCLUSION
Where regulators are charged with supervising complex realms of human
action, the administrative state confronts a crisis. The problem of regula-
tors’ bounded rationality emerges as less of an obstacle to be overcome
than a structural impediment to effective policy. Nowhere is this problem
more evident than in the financial sector, where today as in previous,
simpler decades, regulators are responsible for ensuring systemic financial
stability and supervising individual institutions, despite the increasingly
complex market environment. This article’s contribution to the financial
regulatory literature is to investigate in detail the question of financial
market complexity, drawing on recent research by complexity scientists
showing that, along certain dimensions, financial markets are indeed
complex rather than merely complicated. But highlighting the inherent
difficulties of regulating complexity is only a diagnostic, preliminary step.
What is missing is a systematic theory for how to rehabilitate the regulatory
system so that it is better able to preserve the continued reliability of
the core functions that the financial industry provides to the economy.
I hope that this article, by developing the notion of complexity capture
and demonstrating the problems associated with continued reliance on
industry-provided information and highly particularized systems of behav-
ioral regulation, also makes a modest contribution to efforts to theorize a
regulatory approach to combat the instability that complexity necessarily
entails. Bearing in mind that current network infrastructures of financial
markets are susceptible to harmful endogenous phenomena such as posi-
tive feedback effects, normal accidents, and conflicting constraints, policy
makers need to think more seriously about building a resilient market
structure.
376ICB FINAL REPORT, supra note 266, at 25.
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